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As Chair of Alzheimer Europe and in connection with my professional experience in the field 
of dementia and also my personal experience with dementia in my family, I am pleased to 
present this discussion paper which addresses the implications of recognising dementia as a 
potential disability. Alzheimer Europe has long recognised that dementia can result in 
disability. This is reflected in various reports produced in the context of the European 
Dementia Ethics Network, which was set up by Alzheimer Europe in 2009 and addresses a 
different ethical issue every year. However, this is the first time that the organisation has 
dedicated its annual ethics review specifically to dementia and disability. The exploration of 
ethical, policy and practice implications is particularly timely and coincides with ongoing 
developments in the fields of human rights and disability. This paper highlights issues that 
need to be further addressed but in many places takes a clear stance on potential ethical 
issues and on implications for policy and practice. 
Dementia as a disability is a relatively new and emerging area of exploration in which 
disability enables us to look at dementia from a different perspective, or through a different 
lens as it were. Relevant stakeholders need to familiarise themselves with the topics and 
concepts surrounding disability and see where they stand in relation to these.  
This document is the result of a year’s work carried out by the ethics working group in close 
collaboration with the European Working Group of People with Dementia. I would like to 
express my sincere gratitude to the members of both groups who shared their expertise, 
experience and knowledge and in so doing helped raise awareness of dementia and 
disability. The members of the ethics working group, which was chaired by Dianne Gove, 
include Jean Georges, Grainne McGettrick, Timo Williamson, Sébastien Libert, Helen 
Rochford-Brennan, Carmel Geoghegan, Helga Rohra, June Andrews and Simo Vehmas. I 
would also like to offer my grateful thanks to the whole of the European Working Group of 
People with Dementia and their carers/supporters for providing valuable insight and feedback 
on the issues covered.  
As this is a discussion paper, I hope that it will promote debate and contribute towards future 
developments in advocacy and policy insofar as this relates to dementia as a disability.  
Iva Holmerova 




 Page 4 of 61 
 
2 Introduction 
Why did we write this paper? 
People experience dementia in different ways, not just in terms of the type and severity of 
symptoms, but also in terms of how they react to and manage living with dementia. 
Increasingly, people with dementia are expressing a desire to get on with their everyday lives. 
They want to avoid being defined solely in relation to dementia and to continue to be 
considered as valued members of society. This is particularly important as the term dementia 
often has negative connotations. It is widely considered as a stigma. Neurological impairment 
may interfere with people’s ability to get on with their lives, as may differences in coping skills, 
financial resources, the emotional and psychological impact of dementia, and access to timely 
and good quality support. Reactions of relatives, friends and fellow citizens are also 
important, as well as society’s response to dementia. This was highlighted by Kitwood in the 
1990s when he outlined what came to be known as the biopsychosocial model of dementia
1
. 
There are also differences at the level of society, reflected in practices, attitudes and 
structures. These may, on the surface, seem fair or neutral (i.e. “that’s just the way it is”). In 
many cases, however, they reflect a lack of consideration and failure to act in a responsible, 
ethical and even legal way towards people with dementia.  
Alzheimer Europe has long advocated in favour of recognising dementia as a potential 
disability. In its Strategic Plan (2016-2020) ‘Changing perceptions, practice and policy’, it 
stated, 
“Alzheimer Europe and its members fully commit to promoting the rights, dignity and 
autonomy of people living with dementia. These rights are universal, and guaranteed 
in the European Convention of Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil 
and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”. 
Alzheimer Europe believes that policies and research for people with dementia should be 
based on ethical principles. This is also in keeping with the emerging discourse and focus on 
dementia as a disability at national, European and international levels, combined with the 
promotion of human rights, citizenship and social inclusion. When developing the 2017 
workplan, Alzheimer Europe therefore decided to:  
 campaign for the recognition of dementia as a disability; 
 collaborate with Alzheimer’s Disease International on an analysis of how the 
principles enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
can be applied to persons with dementia; 
 join the European Disability Forum to collaborate with other European organisations 
on the development of a European disability strategy and the implementation of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD); 
 focus on the ethical implications linked to the recognition of dementia as a disability.  
Alzheimer Europe’s interest in disability and dementia is also linked to the desire to promote 
the human rights of people with dementia. In the World Helath Organisation (WHO) 2011 
Report on Disability, disability is described as a human rights issue because: 
                                                     
 
1
 See Sections 7 and 8 for more about Kitwood’s work. 
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“People with disabilities experience inequalities – for example, when they are denied 
equal access to health care, employment, education, or political participation because 
of their disability. 
People with disabilities are subject to violations of dignity – for example, when they 
are subjected to violence, abuse, prejudice, or disrespect because of their disability. 
Some people with disability are denied autonomy – for example, when they are (…..) 
confined in institutions against their will, or when they are regarded as legally 
incompetent because of their disability” (Quinn and Degener 2002, cited in WHO 
2011, p.9). 
People with dementia may experience disability. If so, they should be covered by provisions 
laid down in various national, European and international documents, laws and conventions. It 
is important that everyone, with and without dementia, realises this. This will enable people 
with dementia, if and when needed, to benefit from the same kind of protection and rights 
afforded to other people with disabilities. This should not be taken to imply that dementia per 
se is a disability. Rather, we are suggesting that the impairments experienced by people with 
dementia may in some situations be disabling and that people with disabilities have certain 
rights. This is explained in more detail in section 6.1. Clearly, ethical issues and human rights 
are closely related and intertwined, with one or the other of these two important societal ideals 
being at the forefront of discussions.  
In this report, we focus on the possible implications for ethics, policy and practice of raising 
awareness about the potential of framing dementia as a potential disability.    
What do we mean by ‘implications for ethics, policy and practice’? 
In exploring the ethical implications of viewing dementia as a potential disability, we also 
reflect on what the impact might be in terms of how society is or should be organised and 
what this means for people’s everyday lives. Ethics is not just about big societal issues, which 
are discussed in the media, such as immigration, war, abortion or euthanasia. Often, 
everyday matters have an ethical dimension. The term ‘ethics’ refers to standards which tell 
us how people ought to behave in various situations and how they should live with one 
another. This is often framed in terms of rights, obligations, duties, benefits to society, 
fairness or specific virtues (Velasquez et al, 2010). These standards of behaviour are based 
on perceptions of right and wrong or good and bad. A few decades ago, Beauchamp and 
Childress (2001) developed a set of four biomedical ethical principles . These were:  
(1) respect for autonomy (respecting a person’s independence and ability to decide what 
should happen or be done to him/her),  
(2) beneficence (i.e. doing good, whilst trying to balance possible benefits against risk 
and costs),  
(3) non-maleficence (i.e. avoiding doing harm) and  
(4) justice/equity (treating people equally and fairly through a fair distribution of benefits, 
risk and costs). 
We are going to use these principles in this report as a very broad ethical framework within 
which to reflect on dementia as a disability.  
These principles were originally intended to serve as a framework to guide professional 
medical ethics. They have since been applied in a wide range of contexts. There are also 
other principles and values which are perhaps equally important such as:  
 trustworthiness,  
 honesty,  
 integrity,  
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 compassion,  
 ensuring well-being, 
 confidentiality  
 respect for privacy,personhood and dignity.  
In addition, it is important to consider the lived experiences of people with dementia and the 
complexity of human relationships, and not to rely solely on abstract principles and values. So 
our use of these principles as a guiding ethical framework should be understood quite 
broadly. It encompasses a wider range of principles and values and takes into account 
people’s lived experience and relationships with other members of society.   
The overriding question behind each section in this report is:  
What are the implications for ethics (in terms of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence and  justice/equity), policy and/or practice of this particular topic?  
Who wrote this paper? 
In 2017, two working groups drafted, debated and agreed on a final version of this paper over 
a period of roughly 8 months. They had a total of four face-to-face meetings and numerous 
exchanges of drafts and comments between those meetings. The two groups had expertise in 
relevant areas such as:  
 dementia (knowledge about dementia as well as the experience of having dementia),  
 philosophy,  
 disability,  
 psychology and psychotherapy,  
 law,  
 anthropology and  
 policy making.  
Alzheimer Europe is immensely grateful to the members of these two groups without whom 
we would not have been able to produce this document. Please have a look at the 
acknowledgements section where we have included details about the background of each 
expert.  
What’s in this paper? 
In this paper, we have tried to highlight issues which we feel require attention and may need 
further debate, discussion and reflection. After this introduction, we look, in Section 3, at 
disability-related terms and definitions. We then set the scene in Section 4 by discussing how 
the disability movement evolved and the development of different models (or ways of making 
sense) of disability.  
In Section 5, we consider the relationship between disability and our understanding of 
personhood and dementia. We then consider how accepting that dementia can be a disability 
might impact on the lives of people with dementia (i.e. how they feel about themselves, how 
they relate to others and how they are treated by other people).  
Section 6 on ‘human rights and opportunities’ discusses how recognising that dementia can 
be a disability may be beneficial to people with dementia. It focuses on the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This section also looks at the 
relationship between policy and practice, and considers more abstract rights. These are 
sometimes called capabilities by philosophers. They reflect basic minimum requirements for 
leading “a good life” that every human being should be entitled to.  
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The concept of disability is helpful in raising awareness of people’s right to be treated equally 
and fairly. There is an emphasis on empowerment and society’s responsibility to make 
‘reasonable adjustments or amendments’ to make this possible. However, many people with 
disabilities still need care and support or are dependent on other people in some way in their 
daily lives. In section 7 on care, support, disability and dementia, we therefore look not so 
much at the right to receive such care and support but at issues related to the nature of care, 
support and dependency.   
Rights, law and obligations are important but we also need to consider what is needed and 
approaches that have been adopted so far to make society inclusive. Section 8 is about 
working towards an inclusive society. Here, we examine debates surrounding the dementia-
friendly terminology and concept, and consider what is necessary in order to ensure that 
people with dementia are meaningfully involved in making the societies and communities in 
which they live inclusive.  
This discussion paper reflects a range of expert opinion and a balanced overview of different 
perspectives on the issues addressed. However, we have also included a set of statements 
which were developed by the two working groups and adopted by the Board of Alzheimer 
Europe. These statements are aimed at the general public, governments and policy makers, 
Alzheimer associations, organisations of or for people with disabilities, and regulatory bodies.  
At the end of the report, you will find, as mentioned above, an acknowledgement of the 
important contribution made by members of the two working groups, followed by a glossary of 
terms and abbreviations and a list of references. We realise that this paper addresses a lot of 
complex issues and is quite lengthy. We have tried to avoid the use of jargon and to make the 
report as accessible as possible to a broad audience. However, if you like to see a short 
summary of the whole report in a more accessible format and style, please see: XXXXXXX.  
3 Disability-related terms and definitions  
In this section, we look at some of the key terminology as it both reflects and influences how 
we make sense of disability.  Several factors influence the way we use language, such as:  
 the context,  
 the mood or atmosphere,  
 feelings about the topic 
 the level of comfort with the topic,  
 history,  
 traditions,  
 literature,  
 beliefs and  
 linguistic norms.  
When we hear or read something, we engage in a process of interpretation. We look for cues 
to interpret what is meant. These cues are often constructed around common sense 
assumptions and expectations about the world. We are not generally aware of these and 
consequently, not always in a position to question or challenge them (Garfinkel 1967, 
Fairclough 1995).  
It is therefore important to be conscious of the terms we use when communicating about 
disability. We need to be critically aware of the potential implications of the use of various 
terms. We also need to look at the big picture, namely ‘discourse’, which is not just about 
grammar and words, but about meanings. A term, such as people with disabilities, can 
represent very different meanings and values, depending on how and by whom it is used 
(Chadwick 2000).  
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Impairment and disability: 
In section 4.2, we look at different meanings associated with the terms impairment 
and disability in the context of the different models of disability. The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Person with Disabilities (CRPD), for example, is often 
considered as reflecting the social model of disability. It states that disability results 
‘from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and 
environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on 
an equal basis with others’. In Annex 1, we have provided translations of ‘impairment’ 
and ‘disability’. Wherever possible, we have used translations of Article 1 of this 
convention from http://www.linguee.com and more specifically, selected translations 
from documents available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu. In France, Spain, Finland and 
Germany, for example, the words for disability are handicap, discapacidad, vamma 
and Behinderung and the words for incapacity are incapacité, deficiencia, 
toiminnanrajoite and Beeinträchtung, respectively. 
We then asked for feedback from our national member associations about the 
accuracy of the translations. Some suggested alternative terms, explaining that they 
were more common or appropriate (e.g. in Spain, Greece, Poland, Belgium and Italy). 
In some cases, back-translation revealed an overlap between meanings and the 
existence of additional terms. According to Knoll (2012), confusion and controversies 
over the distinction between disability and impairment also exist within the disability 
rights and disability studies movements.   
Disabled people and people with disabilities: 
Similar disagreement exists about the terms ‘disabled people’ and ‘people with 
disabilities’. People often use these terms interchangeably. Within the disability 
movement, the term ‘disabled person’ is quite common and associated with a political 
message, namely that people are disabled by society. This takes the main focus off 
people’s impairments and challenges the assumption that people with impairments 
are ‘the problem’ (Morris 2001). Perhaps it also implies that they are ‘passive victims’ 
of society.  
The term ‘person with disabilities’, on the other hand, emphasises something that 
people have (i.e. “impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder 
their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others” - just as 
they might also have a degree in chemistry, brown hair, an interest in gardening or 
dementia).  
Whilst many people use the two terms interchangeably, some people and 
organisations have a preference for one or the other. One possible reason for 
preferring the term person or people with disabilities is that it puts the person before 
the disability. Such ‘people-first-language’, it is claimed, helps avoid dehumanising 
people. Rather than reducing them to a condition, it emphasises that they are first 
and foremost a person.  This is somewhat similar to using the term ‘a person who 
stutters’ or ‘a person with schizophrenia’ instead of ‘a stutterer’ or ‘a schizophrenic’. 
Kapitan (2017) argues from a ‘person-first-perspective’ that people who have an 
actual condition or disability should be the ones who determine which term is used.  
At a recent Public Affairs meeting, organised by Alzheimer Europe, representatives 
from 17 national Alzheimer associations all indicated a preference for the term 
‘people with disabilities’. Members of the European Working Group of People with 
Dementia (EWGPWD) and their carers/supporters did not have strong objections to 
the use of either term although the meanings they associated with each term varied 
considerably.   
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Handicap: 
The term handicap exists either alongside other disability-related terms. It is the main 
translation for disability in some countries (e.g. in Romania, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Belgium and France). In 1980, the World Health Organisation 
(in the International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps) 
defined ‘handicap’ as follows:  
“concerned with the disadvantages experienced by the individual as a result 
of impairments and disabilities; handicaps thus reflect interaction with and 
adaptation to the individual's surroundings” (World Health Organisation 
1980). 
The term is sometimes considered derogatory (and is viewed as rather old-
fashioned). This seems to be based on a common misunderstanding that it originates 
from “cap in hand” and from an association with begging (conjuring up images of 
people with disabilities having to beg for a living). Its origin, however, reportedly 
comes from a 17
th
 century game based on bartering called ‘hand in cap’. From the 
late 19
th
 century, people started using the term in connection with horse racing 
whereby a stronger horse would be rendered more equal to the others by putting 
weights under the saddle. Finally, in the 20
th
 century, the term was used first in 
relation to children, and later also for adults with disabilities (Snopes 2011).  
Official definitions of disability 
Whilst definitions of disability are often based on models and theories, they specify 
the properties of disability or the characteristics of people with disabilities, rather than 
having an explanatory purpose (Chadwick 2000). Consequently, certain national, 
European or international definitions may serve to classify who does and does not 
have a disability. This may have a considerable impact on people’s lives (e.g. by 
determining who has access to services and support).  
In the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 
in addition to the definition of disability (mentioned above), article 1 states:  
“(p)ersons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, 
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various 
barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal 
basis with others”.  
In some countries, however, the International Classification of Functioning Disability 
and Health (ICF), adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2001, is used as a means 
to assess disability status. In such cases, the latter might be considered as providing 
an authoritative statement about what disability is. To some extent, this is based on 
perceived norms and departures from those norms and on what ‘accommodations’ 
(changes to prevent discrimination) are considered appropriate. This  neglects, to 
some extent, individual perspectives and collective experiences (Altman 2001, 
reported by Knoll 2012). Some of the models of dsability described in section 4.2 
reflect elements of these two approaches to disability. 
As can be seen from the above summary of definitions and terminology related to disability, 
people use a range of terms for different purposes and in different contexts and documents. 
Chadwick (2000) emphasises the importance of having a mechanism to review various 
definitions (especially those enshrined in laws and policies). This, he suggests, would help 
ensure that they continue ‘to correspond with disabled people’s own perceptions of their 
relationship to the social environment’ (p.8) and perhaps equally important to ensure that they 
are in their interests and can incorporate self-definition.  
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Key messages  
- The meanings associated with different terms may change over time.  
- Definitions, translations and official classifications reflect a particular dominant discourse.  
- This discourse is open to challenge and change; it reflects the historical and cultural 
evolution of words, as well as political concerns.  
- The extent to which the use of various terms and definitions is amenable to change may 
differ depending on the authority of the people or organisation behind them.  
- In keeping with the claim of the disability movement “Nothing about us without us”, we need 
to ensure that people with dementia contribute towards the ongoing refinement of disability-
related terms and challenge them when needed. 
4 About disability  
4.1 About the disability movement  
The modern disability movement began in the 1960s in America. It was about people with 
disabilities coming together to fight for a common cause and to bring about changes in their 
lives. It was influenced by the civil rights movement and the women’s rights movement. At the 
outset, there was a strong emphasis on physical disability. Nowadays, we recognise that 
disability can arise from impairments experienced by people with a wider range of conditions 
(e.g. autistic spectrum disorders [ASD], dyslexia, thrombosis, stroke and coronary heart 
disease, rheumatoid arthritis and dementia). Some people with disabilities may have had 
various impairments from birth or an early age. Others, such as people with dementia, may 
have acquired them later in life and therefore may make a distinction between their former 
and current selves and lives. 
The founders of the disability rights movement were primarily people with significant physical 
disabilities and sensory impairments who developed an independent living movement. They 
promoted the idea that people with disabilities were best placed to determine what their needs 
were. They therefore felt  that they were best placed to  find the most appropriate solutions. 
This, combined with a call for the de-medicalisation of disability and de-institutionalisation, 
involved a quest for social, economic and political recognition and to the gradual expansion to 
include people with other disabilities. This gave rise to the emergence of the social model of 
disability as an alternative to the dominant medical model (see section 4.2).  However, many 
people with cognitive disabilities found self-advocacy more difficult. This may have 
contributed towards their under-representation in the early disability movement and their 
reliance on others to promote their rights.  
This movement, which spread across Europe in the 1980s (Driedgner 1989), was preceded 
by and has led to various developments contributing towards the gradual recognition of the 
needs and rights of people with disabilities. Examples include:  
 large numbers of soldiers returning home with physical and mental impairments after 
the two world wars. Nearly 8 million European soldiers were permanently disabled as 
a result of World War 1 alone according to Kitchen (2000). They could not all be 
institutionalised and this contributed towards a renewed focus in some countries on 
disability (People with Disability Australia 2017);  
 the United Nations declaring 1981 the International Year of Disabled Persons (IYDP). 
This had a clear focus on the human rights of people with disabilities and the removal 
of barriers to their social and civic inclusion in society; 
 Page 12 of 61 
 
 the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibiting discrimination based on 
disability. This resulted in companies with a certain number of employees having to 
make “reasonable accommodations” for employees with disabilities (similar equalities 
legislation has been implemented in several European countries). Public buildings, 
shops and restaurants were required to make ‘reasonable modifications’ to ensure 
access to people with disabilities. Conditions were laid down to promote the access of 
people with disabilities to public transport and their participation in various others 
domains of public life; 
 the founding of the European Disability Forum in 1997. This is run by people with 
disabilities and their families. It has representation in all EU member states; 
 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) of 
2006. This focuses on rights but also promotes the social model of disability 
(described in the next section). This led to a change in the usual and accepted ways 
of thinking about disability. This, in turn, resulted in a radical shift of emphasis from 
substitute decision making to supported decision making; 
 the European Commission (2010) European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: a 
renewed commitment to a barrier-free Europe;  
 the Council of Europe (2017) Disability Strategy 2017-2023 entitled “human rights: a 
reality for all”. 
Many people with disabilities still encounter some degree of discrimination and prejudice. The 
disability rights movement has nevertheless been a massive force for change across the 
world and disability activism continues to prevail in social policy and political discourses. Still, 
it has taken significant time for people with disabilities to have their voices heard. All too often 
their views have been filtered down. Service providers, professionals, relatives and other 
people such as carers, supporters or friends have often spoken on their behalf. There are 
particular challenges to enabling the voice of people with more severe dementia to be heard 
and these need to be addressed. Meanwhile, many people. with dementia (irrespective of 
their possible experience of disability) still encounter this problem.  
Some of the concerns of the disability movement are relevant in the case of dementia, such 
as the move away from a medical model, the right to be heard and to influence policy and 
service development, and the promotion of human rights. This will become more apparent as 
you read the different sections of this paper. It suggests the need for mutual exchanges, 
parallel and shared challenges and to join forces with the disability movement if and when 
necessary in support of common goals or issues.  
Key messages 
- People with disabilities started the disability movement when they came together to 
campaign for their rights and in particular against discrimination. 
- The initial emphasis on physical disability has broadened to encompass people with a wide 
range of impairments and disabilities. 
- The motto of the disability movement is “nothing about us without us”. 
- Dementia is recognised as a condition resulting in impairments which can result in disability. 
- Despite several important developments at local, national, European and international level 
to challenge discrimination and to promote the human rights of people with disabilities, there 
is still progress to be made.  
- It is important to hear the voices of people with dementia within the disability movement so 
as to ensure that subsequent developments correspond to their experiences, needs and 
wishes.   
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4.2 Different models of disability  
The current emphasis in the field of disability research is the result of a long historical 
process. For many years, three main patterns (known as models) of disability could be traced 
in Western culture, namely the moral/spiritual, medical and social models. More recently, 
these models of disability have been challenged and further elaborated. This has resulted in 
alternative or different interpretations of disability. In this section, we look at:  
(1) the moral/spiritual model,  
(2) the medical model, 
(3) the social model  
and three additional, more nuanced models, known as:  
(4) the biopsychosocial model,  
(5) the reinterpreted social model and  
(6) the human rights model.  
We will briefly describe each model and have included a table at the end of the section which 
summarises how each model relates to dementia and to people with dementia. You will find 
references to some of these models again in section 8 which looks at their implications for the 
social inclusion of people with dementia.  
Moral/spiritual model of disability 
The moral/spiritual model of disability is familiar from religious beliefs and teachings. It was 
quite a widespread view in Antiquity (before the Middle Ages)
2
. According to this view, 
disability is often seen as a sign of the moral flaws of an individual, or his or her ancestors. 
People who see disability this way, may, for example, believe that a child’s impairment is the 
result of his/her parents’ moral offences. Similarly, they might consider that a person who is 
impaired later in life, committed a sin or did something that was immoral. According to this 
position, disability is a disadvantageous state, usually a visible impairment, visited upon 
individuals and their families as retribution (e.g. Garland 1995, Silvers 1998, Stiker 1999). 
Although this model of disability can be traced back to ancient times, many people still make 
sense of disability in this way. The belief that disability has a religious or spiritual origin or 
significance may also help some people to cope with any difficulties they might encounter. 
Some view disability as positive difference and gain inner strength from those very beliefs.  
Medical model of disability 
From the 18th century onwards, disability started to be explained by scientific methods, and to 
be reduced to an individual’s physiological or mental ‘deficiencies’. Disability became 
”medicalised”
3
, alongside other phenomena such as alcoholism, homosexuality and 
criminality
4
. The expression ‘medical model of disability’ has become common shorthand for a 
one-sided view which:  
 
                                                     
 
2
 References to disability in key religious texts, such as the Bible, the Torah and the Qur’an, and their 
interpretation, are complex and beyond the expertise of this working group. We are focusing here on 
everyday lay perceptions reflecting a variety of religious and spiritual beliefs. 
3
 A process whereby people and societies are explained increasingly in medical terms. 
4
 The authors are merely reporting here historical changes of perceptions and not implying agreement 
with this way of understanding homosexuality, criminality or alcoholism. 
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 attributes the cause of an individual’s deficits either to 
 bad luck (e.g. accidents),  
 inadequate health practices (e.g. smoking or bad diet) or 
 genes, and  
 
 views disability as the inevitable product of the individual’s 
 biological defects, 
 llnesses or  
 characteristics. 
Disability becomes a personal tragedy that results from the individual’s pathological
5
 condition 
(Barnes, Mercer & Shakespeare 1999, Oliver 1990, 1996, Priestley 2003, Silvers 1998). 
Since the late 1960s, this one-sided medical understanding of disability has been fiercely 
criticised. It has been argued that it portrays disability in a biased manner that leads to 
practices and social arrangements that oppress people with impairments. It also results in 
interventions aimed solely at the ‘abnormal’ individual, with the surrounding environment not 
being considered. Resources are not directed at changing the environment but rather at ways 
to ‘improve’ or ‘repair’ the impaired individual. This, it could be argued, leads to a social and 
moral marginalisation of disabled people, preventing their full participation in society.  
The way we understand and explain a phenomenon such as disability affects the things we 
do to try and  remove the possible hardships associated with it. A certain view and 
understanding makes only certain kinds of responses and actions possible. In other words, if 
the cause of impairment and disability is seen to be spiritual, it is only natural to fix the issue 
with spiritual manoeuvres, such as exorcism and faith healing. If disability is understood in 
terms of medical knowledge and is conflated with impairment, then the reasonable thing to do 
is to focus on improving a person’s condition by means of medical interventions. 
An unfortunate outcome of both of these individualistic approaches to disability has been 
paternalism. This involves making decisions on behalf of others for what is assumed to be 
their own good, even if this is contrary to their wishes. Paternalism can also be seen as a kind 
of expert system whereby the authorities of the relevant knowledge and craft determine how 
the phenomenon in question should be understood and handled. In the religious framework, 
the clergy are considered to be in possession of the truth; in the medical discourse, it is 
doctors and other professionals. In both cases, the autonomy of people with disabilities has 
frequently been trampled upon. They have become mere passive recipients of the benevolent 
assistance provided by professionals and other believers of the dominant disability discourse. 
This has been especially the case for people with dementia. The corresponding medical 
model of dementia typically focuses on the workings of the  brain, over-emphasises incapacity 
and leaves little room for the voice of people with dementia to be heard. 
Social model of disability 
The deficiencies of individualistic approaches to disability seem quite clear. The emergence of 
a social understanding of disability has therefore been a welcome change to the disability 
discourse and to institutional responses to the lives of people with disabilities. Nowadays, it is 
widely acknowledged that disability is not merely a matter of biological impairment but also, 
and perhaps primarily, a social phenomenon. Disablement cannot be explained and 
understood simply in terms of people’s impairment but, rather, in terms of social 
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 Something that is caused by a physical or mental disease. 
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arrangements. In other words, it is not only individuals and their alleged incapacities that 
explain the limited opportunities of people with impairments but society too.  
In Europe, the British social model of disability is the most well-known conceptualisation of 
disability as a social phenomenon. It clearly distinguishes between impairment and disability, 
whereby:  
impairment is defined as ‘lacking all or part of a limb, or having a defective limb, 
organism or mechanism of the body’,  
disability is defined as ‘the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a 
contemporary social organisation which takes little or no account of people who have 
physical [sic] impairments and thus excludes them from participation in the 
mainstream of social activities’ (Oliver 1996, p.22). 
The core idea of the social model is that people with disabilities are an oppressed social 
group. Their assumed inferior status is not a natural effect of their impairment, but it is 
produced by unjust social arrangements. Disability is seen as the material product of socio-
economic relations developed within a specific historical context. This approach focuses on 
the disabling barriers and material relations of power (Priestley 1998, Shakespeare & Watson 
2001). It should also be noted that it is now generally accepted that impairments can be of a 
mental or cognitive nature and therefore include people with dementia (Mental Health 
Foundation 2015). 
One criticism levelled against the social model is the role, meaning and significance of body 
and impairment. It defines disability as a form of social oppression and hence as a 
phenomenon that should be conceptualised in social terms. Individual properties, such as 
impairments related to dementia, are not the main focus of this approach. Rather, it focuses 
on analysing the social causes of disability. As a result, in Britain the study of impairment has 
been somewhat neglected by disability scholars (e.g. Hughes 2002, Thomas 2002). This is a 
serious shortcoming in the social model of disability. Any theoretical account attempting to 
explain and theorise disability satisfactorily needs to take into account corporeal
6
 issues (i.e. 
the lived experience of impairments for people with disabilities) (e.g. Corker & Shakespeare 
2002, Morris 1991,Shakespeare 2014, Thomas 1999, Wendell 1996).  
The biopsychosocial model of disability 
Altogether, one of the most constant and pressing issues in disability studies is the meaning 
and significance of impairment. To what extent are bodily features the essential nature of the 
human body and to what extent are they social constructs? What would be proper responses 
to people’s impairment-related needs? Can we really attribute all disability related to dementia 
to external social factors?  The World Health Organisation (WHO) claims that a good model of 
disability is “one that synthesizes what is true in the medical and social models, without 
making the mistake each makes in reducing the whole, complex notion of disability to one of 
its aspects” (WHO 2002, p.9). This synthesis, according to the WHO, results in a coherent 
view of different perspectives of health (biological, individual and social), which has come to 
be known as the biopsychosocial model of disability.  
This biopsychosocial model of disability takes into account medical, psychological, social and 
environmental factors influencing a particular health condition, functioning and disability. It 
emphasises that everyone may experience a decrement (deterioration) in health and thereby 
experience some disability. This contributes towards mainstreaming the experience of 
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 and recognising it as a universal human experience. The medical and social 
models, in focusing on one particular factor, risk overlooking the complexity of issues related 
to disability. The biopsychosocial model of disability takes the emphasis off diagnoses for the 
planning and management of any support, care or treatment that people with disabilities may 
need. Nevertheless, the medical, social and biopsychosocial models of disability all reflect to 
some extent fixed assumptions about what is ordinary, abnormal, normal living, a social 
problem, dependence and interdependence, as well as certain goals, such as being a citizen, 
and certain states of being which are desirable (Smith 2009). It is important to be conscious of 
the difference between normal in the sense of what is average, common or standard and 
normal in the sense of how things should be. According to Chadwick (2000), when normality 
is formally defined, there is a risk of the two ways of understanding ‘normal’ becoming 
muddled. This may result in the systematic attachment of negative value judgements to 
people with disabilities.  
The reinterpreted social model of disability 
The reinterpreted social model of disability gives greater emphasis to the personal experience 
of disability, in addition to social and environmental factors. This includes the way a person 
experiences a particular condition, impairment or disability (e.g. not necessarily as a personal 
disaster but in terms of personal growth and spiritual, philosophical or psychological benefits). 
It takes the focus off a socially constructed definition of disability, based on deficiency and 
departure from the norm, onto one which reflects how disability is experienced by people with 
disabilities. This might, for example, involve a greater focus on personal achievements, the 
enjoyment of life, personal identity and self-awareness (Smith 2009, Swain et al. 2003), and 
in the case of dementia on remaining capacities and just getting on with life. This model does 
not suggest the absence of social barriers but rather emphasises that people with disabilities 
should be the ones to define which barriers are most important and relevant to their lives and 
their objectives. In other words, the model acknowledges personal experience and human 
agency. 
Similarly, there have been criticisms recently of the term ‘care’, especially in response to the 
medical model of disability and a desire to reframe it as just one aspect of support. Many 
people with dementia, especially in countries where there are limited care and support 
provisions, would like to have greater access to care. They do not see it in a negative light 
(e.g. as a indication of dependency and passivity) but as something to which they are entitled 
and which may contribute towards their dignity and quality of life. The current focus on 
independent living in relation to disability is surely positive. Nevertheless, it also reflects a 
social construction which must be balanced against recognition of the right to independent 
thinking and recognition of the experience of people with disabilities (Smith 2009).  
The way that people experience  impairments or disability may also be influenced in part by 
cultural differences. This calls for a greater understanding of and respect for cultural beliefs 
surrounding dementia held by some ethnic minority groups. At the same time, we should not 
assume that all members of a particular identifiable group (e.g. sharing a common ethnic or 
religious background) think alike. Moreover, Morris (1991) suggests that lifting the pressure to 
conform to the aspirations of the majority (without disabilities) can be liberating. She further 
suggests that by embracing impairments, rather than fighting against them, a person ceases 
to be disabled by them. Nevertheless, a possible criticism of the reinterpreted social model of 
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 Ensuring that the experience of disability is considered and central to all activities - policy 
development, research, advocacy/dialogue, legislation, resource allocation and planning, 
implementation and monitoring of support etc. 
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disability is that it might sometimes lead to an over-emphasis on positive aspects of living with 
disability. This might, in turn, lead to overlooking some of the more unpleasant and difficult 




The human rights model of disability 
With the human rights model of disability, irrespective of whether a particular condition is seen 
as a disability or health condition, the emphasis is on: 
1. the recognition of the person with a particular condition or impairment as an equal 
citizen (‘rights holder’) and  
2. others as having duties and responsibilities (‘duty holders’) towards him or her.  
A key aim of this approach is to ensure: 
 that people with disabilities have the same rights as other citizens to contribute 
towards society,  
 that they enjoy the same benefits and  
 that they take the same risks as people without disabilities.  
This may be achieved through rules, regulations and laws, as well as through carefully 
planned and meaningful involvement of people with disabilities in society. The PANEL 
principles are often provided as useful guidance for the implementation of a human-rights 
based approach. The PANEL principles are:  
Participation (of rights holders) 
Accountability (of duty holders towards rights holders) 
Non-discrimination and equality (of duty holders towards rights holders) 
Empowerment (of rights holders) 
Legality (of duty holders’ actions) 
The European Commission has provided further guidance to using the PANEL principles in 
the form of the FAIR flowchart. This consists of establishing the Facts, Analysing the rights at 
stake, Identifying who is responsible for bringing about change and Reviewing any action 
taken (see the Scottish Human Rights Commission leaflet for more details: 
www.scottishhumanrights.com). 
Laws and regulations can be effective when properly designed, implemented, respected and 
monitored. Unfortunately, they sometimes result in individuals, service providers and official 
bodies merely doing the minimum necessary to the tick the box, and not striving to ensure full 
citizenship. Indeed, for meaningful involvement in society (e.g. in local and national decision 
making, accessing good and services, choosing where and how to live, and having the 
opportunity to form and maintain relationships with other people), attitudes and interpersonal 
interactions are also important.  
However, as mentioned  earlier, not everyone who experiences dementia has the same  
objectives. Many people with disabilities and disability activists have rejected responses to 
disability which reflect pity or charity and to being ‘friendly’ or ‘nice’ to people with disabilities 
(which may be well intended but sometimes perceived as patronising). Positive and 
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 Excessively cheerful or optimistic with a tendancy to find good in everything (based on the heroine of a 
children’s story written by Eleanor Hodgman Porter).  
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supportive actions, based on the principles of solidarity, justice and mutual respect, should 
nevertheless be encouraged. Similarly, it should not be assumed that government officials, 
service providers and people responsible for discrimination are non disabled. People without 
disabilities and those with disabilities are all rights holders and duty holders, even though the 
latter may require varying degrees of support to exercise those rights and duties.   
Finally, disability rights must be properly enforced. They must also be accompanied by 
coherent policies and strategies for social change, appropriate funding and effective 
monitoring (Crowther 2017). It is essential that policy makers and those responsible for the 
enforcement of laws and regulations ensure that these are also applicable to and suited to the 
needs of people with dementia (see also section 6.2 on policy in practice).  
Summary of key points raised in this section  
- People make sense of disability in different ways, which are sometimes described as 
“models” of disability. 
- These models have developed over time in a fairly linear fashion but exist alongside each 
other because different people find meaning in each of them.  
- With the possible exceptions of the moral/spiritual and medical model of disability 
(considered by many as pejorative or an inaccurate interpretation of disability forming the 
basis for potential abuse, oppression and exploitation), each model aims to be progressive. It 
builds on some elements of existing models, sometimes responding to a perceived gap or 
flaw and often having a particular focus (e.g. on societal barriers, human rights or the 
experience of impairment). 
- The way that people make sense of disability can have a considerable impact on the lives of 
people with disabilities and their family and friends because most models reflect a certain 
understanding of the cause and hence of the way to address disability. 
- Table 1 below provides an overview of how some of the different models of disability relate 
to dementia and the possible implications of each for people with dementia. 
 
Table 1: (Some) Models of disability in the context of dementia 
Model of disability How the model relates to 
dementia 
Implications for the person 
with dementia 
Moral/spiritual Dementia is considered a curse or 
moral flaw in the individual. 
Dementia is visited upon the 
individual as retribution or as a 
divine test. 
The person is subjected to 
prayer,  seeking a miracle cure 
or spiritual “healing” 
interventions. Some people 
may feel inspired and able to 
cope as a result of their 
religious or spiritual beliefs.  
Medical Dementia is considered as 
resulting solely from biomedical 
causes and sometimes perceived 
as a personal tragedy. The flaw is 
considered as being in the 
individual only. 
This aims to cure or ‘fix’ the 
person with dementia with 
medical interventions or make 
him/her fit in. Others (e.g. 
doctors) are considered to 
know what is best. There is 
little or no voice for the person 
with dementia. 
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Social Dementia is considered an 
impairment causing disabilities as 
a result of the social/structural 
arrangements in society. 
The focus is on altering the 
social/structural environments 
to eliminate or mitigate the 
negative  experience of 
disability. The person with 
dementia is involved in leading 
the decisions and in collective 
action to achieve change. 
Bio-psycho-social Dementia is considered a multi-
dimensional and a health 
experience that occurs in a 
context. Disability, ill-health and 
human functioning involve 
interactions between biological, 
psychological, social and 
environmental aspects.  
Medical, psychological, social 
and environmental influences 
on dementia as a health 
condition, functioning and 
disability should all be 
addressed. The person with 
dementia is involved in 
decision making and in 




Dementia is considered a  health 
condition, which together with 
contextual factors, accounts for the 
individual’s (social and 
psychological) experience of 
dementia in the broader social 
context. The personal experience 
of dementia (and of related 
physical, sensory and mental 
impairments) is considered as well 
as social and environmental 
factors.  
In addition to altering the 
social/structural environments 
(as with the social model), 
there is greater emphasis on 
how people with dementia 
experience various 
impairments (as well as 
possible resulting disability) 
and also require care, support 
and protection where 
necessary. The person with 
dementia is involved in leading 
decision making and in 
collective action to achieve 
change. 
Human rights Dementia may be seen as a 
disability and/or health condition. 
The human rights model works 
with the social model(s) and the 
bio-psychosocial model but 
recognises  the person as an equal 
citizen (‘rights holder’) and others 
as having duties and 
responsibilities (‘duty holders’).  
The person with dementia has 
his/her rights upheld and 
experiences full inclusion and 
equality. People with dementia 
are active subjects and fully 
included citizens (e.g. in 
keeping with the PANEL 
principles mentioned on pages 
3 and 25). 
5 Personhood and the personal experience of disability  
5.1 Understanding personhood in the context of disability and dementia 
In everyday usage, ‘person’ is usually just another term for human being. It is used  to 
distinguish us from inanimate objects, machines, plants, animals and ‘spirits’. Discussions 
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about personhood in relation to disability and dementia are pretty similar. They both tend to 
draw on the same philosophical theories. Having a disability (or an impairment or dementia) 
does not make someone any less a person than someone who doesn’t. However, some 
philosophical theories of personhood suggest that there are different types and levels of 
personhood. Sometimes, they are presented in such a way that they may have a negative 
impact on people with disabilities, affecting the way they are perceived, how some people 
with disabilities feel about themselves and how they are treated.  
Philosophers tend to emphasise mental traits such as consciousness and rationality as the 
most relevant criteria in the definition of personhood. But to most people these traits are not 
as important as bodily shape (e.g. looking like a human being). Moreover, animals, however 
intelligent they may be, are not considered to be persons while humans, including infants and 
people with severe cognitive impairments, are (Sapontzis 1987, pp.48-49). 
Personhood is usually connected to the moral realm. The expression ‘person’ is generally 
understood as implying a specific moral status. A person, in a moral sense, is a being whose 
interests must be respected. When we consider what is morally acceptable or preferable, we 
are morally obliged to take into account what will promote dignity or demean, benefit or harm, 
satisfy or dissatisfy, and so on, any being that is a person and that is likely to be affected by 
our actions. In other words, a person is a being with moral and social rights.  
Some philosophers argue that moral personhood has different levels, in the sense that some 
beings are more persons than others. They state that in a moral sense, children are not full 
persons in comparison with adults (Sapontzis 1987, p.50). For example, children have rights 
to life, against abuse, and so on, although they are denied rights to property, marriage and 
voting. Some of their rights, such as autonomy, may be less fully respected than the 
corresponding rights of adults. In some cases, they are not held responsible for their actions. 
Similarly, it has been argued that some people, who are deemed to have very little in common 
with people in general, are ‘non- persons’ (Buchanan, 1988). Such philosophical arguments 
are, at the very least, unhelpful and at most, deeply offensive and damaging to the dignity, 
wellbeing and, in some cases, even to the survival of people with dementia.   
In philosophy, there are competing views about personhood but most accounts regard mental 
ability as a necessary condition. This includes being conscious of the world, thinking about it 
and seeking to understand it (see Peacocke & Gillett 1987). John Locke developed a new 
philosophical framework in Western philosophy for the pursuit of understanding and theorising 
about ‘the person’. According to Locke, a person is “a thinking intelligent Being, that has 
reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different 
times and places”(Locke 1975/1690, Bk. II, ch. 27, sec. 9). 
The Lockean conception of personhood represents the ideas, attitudes or activities that are 
shared by most people and regarded as normal or conventional in Western philosophy. It is 
usually agreed in philosophy that personhood is a moral issue warranting reflection and 
debate. The lives of beings of this sort (i.e. of persons), it is argued, possess a great 
psychological unity because of their highly developed cognitive capabilities (e.g. linked to 
conceptual abilities, understanding, problem solving and rational decision-making). Their 
advanced mental abilities enable their past and future experiences to form a meaningful unity, 
a biographical life (Buchanan, 1988, Parfit, 1984). In this view, personhood coincides with a 
threshold of moral worth whereby all beings above a particular threshold are considered 
equally morally valuable (e.g. McMahan 2002, Singer 1993). 
With regard to dementia, Post (2006), argues that this hypercognitive definition of personhood 
overvalues what are often termed the ‘higher cognitive functions’ by comparison with other 
qualities such as humour, kindness and generosity. These other qualities are equally 
important to a shared concept of humanity and are not compromised when someone has 
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dementia.  The hypercognitive definition of personhood fails to take into account the 
emotional and relational needs and capacities of people with dementia. Such failure, 
combined with overlooking the importance of social interaction and considering some people 
as non-persons, may contribute towards additional loss of capacity and additional disability 
(Alzheimer Europe 2013).   
Much of the most significant work on personhood and dementia has been carried out by 
Kitwood (1997). According to Kitwood (1997, p.8), the term personhood refers to ‘a standing 
or status that is bestowed upon one human being, by others, in the context of relationship and 
social being. It implies recognition, respect and trust’.  In this view, a person with dementia 
does not forfeit the status of being a unique, and uniquely valuable individual as the result of a 
diagnosis of dementia. Rather, those without dementia have a special obligation to validate, 
maintain and enhance the personhood of those with cognitive disabilities. Beyond this, 
Kitwood suggests that the ‘malignant social psychology’ which often surrounds people with 
dementia in his view, can in fact exacerbate the symptoms of dementia (i.e. make them 
worse) and hasten the apparent progression of the condition.  ‘Dementia’, he says (1997, 
p.19) may be  
“induced in part by the stresses of life.  Thus anyone who envisages the effects of 
care as being “purely psychological” independent of what is happening in the nervous 
system, is perpetuating the error of Descartes in trying to separate mind from body.  
Maintaining personhood is both a psychological and a neurological task.” 
Kitwood’s concept of personhood was influenced to some extent by the work of the German 
philosopher Martin Buber (1878-1965). Buber identified two different ways that people relate 
to one another, reflecting objectification or a genuine exchange (Alzheimer Europe 2013). 
These two ways are described through the word pairs ‘I-It’ and ‘I-Thou’
9
. The I-It mode of 
relating is one in which a person relates to the other in a cool, distanced, non-involved way. 
This fails to fully acknowledge the individuality of the other person as he or she is objectified. 
The I-Thou mode of relating, in contrast, involves meeting the other person in a genuine 
human exchange. With reference to the I-Thou relationship, Barich (1998) states, “You 
become a person (as opposed to an alienated and isolated individual) when you enter into 
relation with people.”  
More recently, some philosophers have also argued, in the context of disability and 
personhood, that an individual’s moral worth can also be based on his/her relation to others 
(e.g. Curtis & Vehmas 2016, Kittay 2005, 2010, Vehmas & Curtis 2017). They maintain that 
the ‘human community relation’ is a significant, special relation that bestows moral value on 
those individuals who are part of that relation.  
According to this view, a person can be considered by others as having value on the basis of 
a relation to something/someone else. The idea is that once value has been bestowed
10
 in 
this way, that value then functions to bind all concerned, not merely those who bestow it. In 
this way, some human beings, who might otherwise be considering as lacking the necessary 
psychological properties to be persons, are recognised as persons as a result of certain 
relations they have to other people. But what relations are these? One example would be the 
relations that a person with profound intellectual disability or advanced dementia has to others 
as a result of having being born and cared for by human beings within a human community. 
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 ‘Thou’ means ‘you’. This term is old-fashioned and is therefore not used much nowadays except in 
poetic or religious texts. 
10
 To bestow means to give or present something to someone.  
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These relations must be strong enough to generate obligations and as strong as those that 
exist towards any other person. Importantly, these relations are not purely biological. This is 
why they should not be called ‘species membership relations
11
’ but rather ‘human community 
relations’.  
Precisely what this relation amounts to is difficult to describe. It is the relation that exists 
between each of us and every other human being. It is the relation that exists between a 
human and the rest of the human community as a result of having  been born of human 
parents, brought up and cared for by humans, and in general, treated as a human within the 
human community. Naturally, the relation holds between different individuals and the rest of 
the community in different ways. For example, most people vote, work, pay taxes and engage 
in emotional and social interactions with others. However, it is not necessary for everyone 
(including people with various impairments, dementia or disability etc.) to participate within the 
human community in the same way or to the same extent. All that is required for the relation 
to hold is that an individual is taken into the human community and  treated by the community 
as a human. Speaking at a conference on Alzheimer’s disease in 2014, Longneaux 
concluded that every person must be treated as a person, based on the premise that  a 
human being who has feelings, even if unable to express them or to exercise autonomy, is a 
person. 
Key messages 
- For many people, ‘person’ is simply a term used to refer to a human being or to distinguish 
humans from non-humans (e.g. animals, machines, robots and even supernatural beings).   
- Some philosophers associate the term ‘person’ with the possession of certain capabilities 
such as memory, reasoning and language, which unfortunately implies that some people (e.g. 
with memory problems) are not ‘persons’.   
- Others suggest that personhood is based on relations between and towards other people.  
- These relations imply obligations and the recognition of value (not just based on being a 
human being but on having been born, brought up and cared for by humans, and treated as a 
human within the human community). 
- Being part of the human community is not dependent on the level to which a person can or 
does contribute towards society.  
- All that is required is that a person is taken into the human community and treated as a 
person.  
5.2 The individual and group response to disability 
Your experience is not my experience  
The sub-heading above is taken from an article by Devlieger and Albrecht (2000) who point 
out that we often implicitly assume that everyone experiences disability in a similar way.  
Another common assumption is that being recognised as having a disability can be 
empowering. Disability activists emphasise that discussions about disability should be led by 
people who are directly affected by disability, which in this case is people with disability 
resulting from dementia-related impairments. But this begs a series of questions:  
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 Do people with dementia want to identify with people with disabilities?  
 Do they feel that they have enough in common?  
 Do they face the same issues and have the same priorities as people with other 
disabilities?  
 How would they feel about being described as having a disability or being disabled?  
 Do they feel it labels them pejoratively?  
 Do they feel that the potential empowerment sufficiently outweighs possible perceived 
disadvantages of being considered as having a disability?  
These questions are difficult to answer, partly because literature is lacking on this topic and 
partly because people with dementia are not a homogenous group. Tuija Takala (2009) 
highlights the danger of one-dimensional classifications (i.e. identifying solely with one group) 
and of failing to acknowledge that people choose their identities to some extent and belong to 
a number of communities
12
. This may also lead to overlooking the fact that some groups have 
a political agenda which does not reflect the needs of all the sub-groups. There are many 
sub-groups of people with dementia. Examples include:   
 homeless people,  
 Roma people,  
 people from ethnic minorities,  
 women (or men),  
 people with learning (intellectual) disabilities,  
 people from the LGBT+
13
 community  
 and people who are in prison.  
The origin and development of the impairment may also affect how it is experienced. As 
pointed out by Shakespeare and Watson (2001, p.12), “Congenital impairments
14
 have 
different implications for self-identity than acquired impairments. Some impairments are static, 
others are episodic (occurring only sometimes, not regularly) or degenerative (getting worse 
over time).” Within and across these sub-groups, there are varying similarities and differences 
in the way that disability is experienced.  
Disability is not my sole identity 
People have multiple, intersecting and overlapping identities. They may, therefore, find that at 
one point in time and in a particular context, they identify with disability and with people with 
disability, and that in another, they don’t. Disability should therefore not be viewed as a 
person’s sole or significant identity (Shakespeare 1996). People may also feel differently 
about disability depending on their perceptions of disability and who defines them as having 
one.  
“There is an important difference in my associating myself with a particular group and 
others giving me the label” (Shakespeare 2006, cited in Takala 2009, p.131).  
Not everyone wants to openly state that they have a disability or to advocate for people with 
disabilities. As one woman with disabilities stated:   
“I’m not interested in celebrating a status, or not celebrating a status. I am just 
interested in living my life. I don’t have to have a banner that has to say, “disability is 
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delightful.” I don’t have to have a banner that says, “being female is fabulous.” I’m 
female. I’m disabled. Don’t get in my way. Don’t bother me. Don’t deny me 
opportunity. That’s my basic political view” (Adrienne Asch, cited in Kroll 2012, p.65). 
As Shakespeare points out, the goal of disability politics should be ‘to make impairment and 
disability irrelevant whenever possible, not to seek out and celebrate a separatist notion of 
disability pride based on an ethnic conception of disability identity’ (cited in Takala 2009, 
p.131).  
It is therefore important to respect everyone’s right to accept or refuse, partially or fully, 
disability as part of their identity. We need to hear the voice of people with dementia from all 
walks of life, identify common experiences of disability and see people with disabilities as 
individuals (rather than as caricatures of a group we think they represent, Takala, 2009).  
Emotional and psychological impact 
Accepting that one has a disability may have an emotional and sometimes psychological 
impact on a person. Some people may feel embarrassed or fear rejection or devaluation. 
Accepting or being labelled as having a disability may also have an impact on a person’s 
autobiographical and social self and on their self-concept. According to Harré (2004):  
 the autobiographical self is a person’s story of who they are, 
 the social self (or selves) consists of the qualities a person displays in encounters 
with other people and  
 the self-concept consists of the beliefs people have about who they are (about their 
qualities, the kinds of lives they lead etc.).  
Many people who live with dementia will already have experienced some change in their self-
concept and in their autobiographical and social selves (sometimes in a positive sense, 
recognising qualities they didn’t know they had). Some may have experienced social 
positioning (i.e. finding that their rights and duties are influenced by shared assumptions 
about what having dementia means) (Harré 2004).  
In focus group discussions with the EWGPWD whilst drafting this report, some members 
described feelings of guilt, shame and anger linked to their experience of using or requesting 
services for people with disabilities. They described negative and even hostile reactions from 
other people which they felt were based on a lack of understanding of impairments and 
subsequent disabilities associated with dementia. Often such reactions seemed to be linked 
to their impairments not being visible.    
 “Like when you come out of the rest room and people look at you as if to say ‘What 
are you doing in there? There’s nothing wrong with you’” (member of EWGPWD). 
 “Sometimes when she is in the ‘disabled lane’ in shops, people question why she is 
there. They say she should get out of that lane. She refuses but also does not think 
that she should have to explain about her condition” (carer/supporter). 
On the other hand, a clear theme, which emerged from the focus group discussion involving 
the EWGPWD, was that some felt that having a disability was considered more acceptable 
than having dementia and more likely to result in a positive response from others:    
“I can’t speak for anyone else, but in XXX being disabled is much more acceptable 
than having a diagnosis of dementia. It’s a better label” (member of the EWGPWD). 
 “I would feel very happy saying I have a disability. If I say I have dementia, you know, 
they are going to say ‘oh God, she’s mad’ and kind of ‘see you later!’ but you know, 
when you’re saying you have a disability – and maybe it’s where we live in all fairness 
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– at home it’s a much much more accepted word. It’s totally accepted” (member of 
the EWGPWD). 
Nevertheless, and in keeping with our earlier comment that people don’t all share the same 
experience, one member of the group expressed quite different views about identifying as a 
person with a disability. She later linked these to being considered abnormal:  
“But then again, I think each one of you thinks differently. It’s how you think about 
yourselves. I’ve got a problem with it to be honest but we’re all different. Some people 
would be upset to go down that road. So, it’s for the individual. …..I really wouldn’t 
like to class myself as being disabled. I wouldn’t go about saying I’ve got disability. I 
think it would make me feel a bit…. you know” (member of the EWGPWD). 
Stigma 
Both dementia and disability are frequently associated with stigma. This also includes private 
stigma whereby a person or group internalises the perceived stigmatising attitudes of others 
and experiences or anticipates discrimination (Rüsch, Angermeyer & Corrigan 2005, 
Thornicroft et al. 2009). This may lead to people feeling devalued and fearing discrimination, 
even in the absence of any negative reaction from other people
15
.  
Accepting that everyone may experience some degree of disability at some point in their lives  
may eventually blur the boundaries, in a positive sense, between people with and without 
disabilities. Indeed, there is a growing awareness that ‘the disabled are same and different’ 
(Devlieger, Rüsch & Pfeiffer 2003). However, in many contexts, people with disabilities are 
still considered as ‘the Other’ (Murphy 1987) and people without disability continue to define 
themselves in relation to this ‘Other’, which is perceived as a kind of pathological population 
(Branson & Miller 2002).  
In this section, we have emphasised the importance of recognising how people with dementia 
experience disability in different ways and the extent to which they may or may not wish to 
identify with people with other disabilities. The next section looks at some of the ways that 
identifying with disability may be beneficial. In particular, we look at how it can give access to 
certain rights, but also at some of the possible limitations of rights-based approaches to 
disability in the case of dementia. 
Key messages  
- Disabilty means different things to different people.  
- People with disabilities do not constitute a single, unified group of people, do not all 
experience disability in the same way and do not all have the same goals.  
- It can nevertheless be helpful, for those who want to, to group together to campaign for 
rights and raise awareness about disability.  
- Not everyone with dementia wants to identify with disability. Doing so can have an emotional 
and psychological impact.  
- Some people fear that they will be stigmatised if they identify with disability. Others, may feel 
that disability is less stigmatising than dementia, and that being considered as having a 
disability is empowering.  
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- More effort is needed to find out what people with dementia think and feel about dementia 
as a disability. 
6 Human rights and opportunities 
6.1 Disability, dementia and rights 
Nation states and international institutions alike have recognised that people with disabilities 
require legislation to have their rights upheld. People with disabilities are a minority group in 
society who are deemed to experience discrimination, inequality and exclusion.  
In many countries, legislation on human rights, equality and disability is highly relevant to 
people with dementia. General data on how people with dementia specifically utilise national 
legislation is not available. However, it is likely that it is not routinely used as a way of 
upholding rights or addressing the inequalities and discrimination that people face. There are 
a number of reasons for this. One such reason is that historically dementia has not generally 
been viewed as a disability for the reasons already described. According to the UK Dementia 
Engagement and Empowerment Project
16
 (DEEP 2016), there is ‘confusion and ignorance’ 
with regard to people with dementia, rights and disability law. DEEP states that people with 
dementia are often unable to insist on getting what they are entitled to by law and many are 
reluctant to frame their issues in terms of rights, even if they are aware of them. 
From an international law perspective, a number of pieces of legislation are relevant. The 
focus of this section is on one specific piece of international legislation on disability, namely 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 
The main components of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  
The CRPD is an international treaty passed by the United Nations in 2006 and ratified (made 
legally binding) by 168 countries worldwide (including 27 European Union member states). 
The essence of the CRPD is to promote and protect the rights of people with disabilities. It 
aims to ensure their enjoyment of human rights and equality under the law and represents a 
legal framework for applying generic human rights legislation that is meaningful for people 
with disabilities.  It is far-reaching and calls for fundamental change in terms of society’s 
approach to understanding and responding to disability (Mental Health Foundation 2015). 
The CRPD adopts human rights principles (Article 3, General principles).  It defines disability 
as including “those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments 
which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in 
society on an equal basis with others” (United Nations 2006). 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and dementia 
There are 38 cross-cutting articles in the CRPD, all of which are relevant to people with 
dementia. Specific articles that are highly relevant include:   
Article 9: Accessibility (ensuring accessible environments, transport, information and 
services), 
Article 19: Living independently (choosing where to live, having access to supports to 
live in community), 
Article 25: Health (right to quality health services), 
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Article 26: Habilitation and rehabilitation (maximising independence via 
comprehensive habilitation and rehabilitation services), 
Article 28: Adequate standard of living and social protection (the right to adequate 
standard of living and social protection), 
Article 29: Participation in political and public life (having the equal right to participate 
in public life). 
It is worth specifically highlighting Article 12, ‘Equal recognition before the law’. This is 
extremely important for people with dementia as it refers to the person with disability as 
having legal capacity (decision-making ability) on an equal basis in all aspects of life. It also 
includes a section on supported decision making which respects the person’s autonomy, will 
and preferences. This differs from substituted decision making/guardianship models where 
someone else can have the authority to make a decision on a person’s behalf. Article 12 
promotes and protects legal personhood (Crowther 2016) and the autonomy of people with 
dementia who otherwise would have been considered as lacking capacity. It is highly relevant 
as people with dementia often find their ‘autonomy automatically undermined or removed 
following diagnosis or who do not presently enjoy access to independent advocacy for 
support with major decisions such as in relation to heath, financial matter or their fitness to 
drive or travel’. However, the Mental Health Foundation (2015) paper states that it is unclear if 
there are any existing mental capacity legal frameworks in the world that are fully compliant 
with the CRPD. This is partly because it requires a total supported decision-making legal 
regime, which poses significant challenges in the case of people with advanced dementia 
(and profound intellectual disabilities).  Shakespeare (2017) also concludes that the wording 
and implications of Article 12 are ‘very hard to elucidate or implement practically’. The 
implications of Article 12 have been subject to considerable scrutiny and debate elsewhere 
(see for example the work of the Essex Autonomy Project (2014 & 2016)). 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and dementia advocacy 
While acknowledging that international legislation is only one element of bringing about 
change, the CRPD is very relevant for people with dementia from a number of perspectives.  
The history of the disability rights movement indicates that disabled people have not only 
successfully advocated to have their rights enshrined in a specific international legal 
instrument but that they have used it successfully as a catalyst for change in many countries 
across the world.  Quinn (2009, p.2), one of the architects of the CPRD, argues that the real 
added-value of the CRPD is its ability to trigger ‘a new kind of disability politics worldwide’.    
In a similar way, dementia advocates can utilise the CRPD as an instrument for social change 
and as a potential advocacy tool. Furthermore, regardless of their status as being inside 
and/or outside of the disability rights movement, the CRPD can be used by dementia 
advocates in realising people’s human rights, altering how dementia is perceived and 
influencing how policy and services are developed.  
Crowther (2016) argues that the use of the CRPD as a tool for social change could be 
particularly useful in countries to achieve practical outcomes in access to health and everyday 
services, reduction in the use of restraint and anti-psychotic medication and the availability of 
high quality social care and support. The CRPD is particular relevant to addressing stigma, 
discrimination and social isolation that is commonly associated with the lived experience of 
dementia. Crowther (2016) sees stigma as a barrier to the participation in society of people 
with dementia and to achieving the social change necessary to secure their inclusion and 
well-being. 
Shakespeare et al. (2017) agree that whilst people with dementia will vary in terms of their 
willingness to be identified as disabled, they, like other groups in society, can still use the 
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CRPD as a ‘tool to advance their rights’. Dementia Alliance International (2016) suggests that 
Alzheimer organisations and self-advocacy organisations can use the CRPD to lobby and 
advocate for dementia policies and future plans to reflect the CRPD principles and articles.  It 
can be utilised to guarantee that people with dementia are enabled to participate as equals in 
developing policy.  
Furthermore, Alzheimer organisations can also use the CRPD to hold national governments 
to account, in terms of their progress with its implementation, to the United Nations (UN). In 
the United Kingdom, two reports were submitted to the UN Committee responsible for the 
CRPD in 2017, co-produced with people with dementia. These reports outlined key issues 
regarding the lack of compliance with the CRPD as it relates to people with dementia 
(Alzheimer’s Society 2017, Dementia Policy Think Tank et al. 2017). The issues raised by the 
Dementia Think Tank’s report (2017) are cross-cutting and include themes such as 
stereotyping and prejudice, accessible transport, independent living and community inclusion, 
accessible care and work. The Alzheimer’s Society (2017) concludes that the stigma, 
prejudice and lack of understanding about the condition, as well as discrimination on multiple 
grounds including age and gender, compound an existing postcode lottery
17
 of services for 
people affected by dementia in the United Kingdom. . 
In conclusion, an international convention in the form of the CRPD, combined with a range of 
other advocacy tools, offers a meaningful opportunity for people with dementia to move away 
from being ‘trapped within the dominant medical discourse’ (Shakespeare 2017, p.4). 
However, using it in a meaningful way requires more effort and time as highlighted by the 
EWGPWD
18
. While members of the EWGPWD were strongly in favour of recognising 
dementia as a disability they raised concerns about how the rights associated with this could 
be realised in practice and be of benefit to the lives of people with dementia on a day-to-day 
basis. 
Key messages 
- National and international law has relevance to the lives of people with dementia to ensure 
their rights are upheld. 
- The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is one  
important piece of international legislation that is relevant to help people with dementia enjoy 
human rights and quality under the law. 
- Article 12 of the CRPD, recognition before the law, is critical.  It states that the person has 
legal capacity (decision making ability) on an equal basis in all aspects of life. 
- The CRPD is a tool that dementia advocates, Alzheimer and other organisations  can use to 
advocate for change. 
6.2 Policy in practice 
The recognition of dementia as a potential disability resulting in the right to “reasonable 
accommodation” (e.g. in relation to employment, mobility and housing), and the difficulties 
surrounding the translation of ideas and attitudes into actual practice, were highlighted 
recently in relation to nurses who develop dementia. In an article, which appeared on the BBC 
news website, Dreaper (2017) reported discussions which took place at the Royal College of 
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 A random variation of service access and availability according to where one lives. 
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 During focus group discussion with the whole European Working Group of People with Dementia on 
14 May 2017 in Luxembourg. 
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Nursing's (RCN) Annual Congress in Liverpool (United Kingdom). The RCN decided, on the 
basis of a vote, that nurses who have dementia should be supported to continue their work for 
as long as they are able. Some members nevertheless raised concerns about nurses who 
have dementia putting others at risk. However, Jo James, a dementia nurse from London, put 
this in perspective, pointing out that dementia does not lead to instant loss of capacity or 
disability. 
"A dementia diagnosis is likely to signal the end of a nurse's professional life. In a 
single moment they will go from nurse to patient, regardless of the severity of their 
dementia or how it's affecting them. We have robust laws in place against 
discrimination - but dementia is often seen as the exception to the rule and 
stigmatised" (Dreaper 2017). 
National laws are important in seeking to ensure that conventions are respected and properly 
implemented. Important discussions are also taking place at European level (e.g. in relation to 
the Accessibility Act). Similarly, the Disability Strategy 2017-2023 of the Council of Europe 
(2017) seeks to achieve equality, dignity and equal opportunities. It does this by targeting 
action and policy development, involving civil society organisations and organisations of 
people with disabilities, in five key domains:  
1. participation, co-operation and coordination,  
2. universal design and reasonable accommodation,  
3. gender equality,  
4. multiple discrimination and  
5. education and training.   
The European Disabilty Strategy 2010 – 2020 (European Commission 2010), on the other 
hand, seeks to empower people with disabilities and calls for consistency. It identifies actions 
at EU level to supplement national actions, whilst focusing on eight main areas. These 
include: 
1. accessibility,  
2. participation,  
3. equality,  
4. employment,  
5. education and training, 
6. social protection,  
7. health and  
8. external action.  
There is plenty of commitment to making a positive change in the lives of people with 
disabilities. However, existing measures (e.g. to promote accessibility) are not always carried 
out consistently, or implemented correctly. Similarly, they do not always sufficiently account 
for the needs of groups of people with certain impairments
19
 (which would include those 
typically associated with dementia).  
At a more local, grass roots level, several groups of people with dementia that are part of the 
DEEP network in the UK
20
 have been involved in a project called ‘Our Right to Get Out and 
About’. The aim of the project was to make rights meaningful in the day-to-day lives of people 
with dementia (and their carers/supporters). It focused on the accessibility of buses and trains 
                                                     
 
19
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 For more details about the work of DEEP, please see: http://dementiavoices.org.uk/  
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for people with dementia, and getting a disabled car parking dispensation (known as the ‘Blue 
Badge’ scheme). The groups have engaged with public transport providers, and local and 
national government to lobby for changes in accessibility and information regarding transport 
that takes into account the cognitive impairments and disabilities that dementia can cause.    
The social model/human rights principles have emerged in policy, specifically in relation to 
national dementia strategies, albeit in a limited number of countries.  The second Scottish 
National Dementia Strategy (SNDS) made very explicit reference to human rights principles. 
These permeated not only the development but also the implementation of the SNDS. The 
Scottish Dementia Working Group was one of the key actors in contributing to the 
development of the policy which followed a rights based approach.  
It is encouraging to see, in addition to high level guidance, strategies and even local 
initiatives, the recent development of fairly concrete guidelines and recommendations (e.g. 
linked to specific professions or work situations). Mental Health Europe, for example, has 
produced a toolkit on Article 27 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) to guide employers, human resource personnel, employment support 
services, and any other interested stakeholders, on how to apply a human rights-based 
approach to work and employment for people with psychosocial disabilities. At the same time, 
it is important to distinguish between a conditional right (e.g. the right to carry on working but 
not to put other people at risk) and an absolute right (e.g. the right to be treated with dignity - 
which is not dependent on anything else). It may be difficult to achieve the right balance. 
There are likely to be stong differences of opinion but in a fair society, respect for everyone’s 
rights, non-discrimination and respect for dignity must be key objectives.  
Whatever support is available for people with disabilities must be available for people with 
dementia. So with regard to cognitive impairment, if this affects a person’s ability to do things 
and be involved in society, reasonable adjustments must be made (e.g. to continue working). 
If that is not enough, a person must be entitled to financial support for loss of income. The two 
approaches to support, which may reflect and stem from different policies, must be 
coordinated. It would be unacceptable, for example, for a person to lose his or her job 
because of impairments resulting in disability and then not be considered eligible for 
appropriate benefit/support.  
Similarly, protective measures forpeople with disabilities must also be applicable to people 
with dementia. The latter should not be considered an exception due to the nature of their 
impairments.  
The need to translate ideals and goals into coordinated policies, with appropriate funding 
behind them and effective monitoring, is essential for people with disabilities. People with 
dementia should be entitled to the same type and level of protection, respect for human rights 
and social inclusion as other people with disabilities. Any policies or practices which promote 
or condone a different treatment of people with dementia must be based on ethically 
defensible grounds.  
 
Key messages 
- Laws, regulations, conventions and strategies etc. promoting the rights of people wtih 
disabilities all need, at some point, to be translated into actual practice and real-life situations. 
- It is important to ensure that such rights are respected and implemented in a consistent and 
fair manner. They must take into account the needs and wishes of people with dementia and 
balance these with the rights of other members of society. 
- Initiatives are needed to make disability rights meaningful in the day-to-day lives of people 
with dementia (and of their carers/supporters). People with dementia and their 
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carers/supporters must play a key role in such initiatives and in the development of policies 
and guidance. 
- Policies to promote the rights of people with dementia and disability must be coordinated, 
have appropriate funding and be monitored.  
6.3 Capabilities and agency 
So far in section 6, we have considered issues related to the promotion of the rights of people 
with dementia who experience disability and issues surrounding the possible consequences 
of having such rights. In this sub-section we will look at disability and dementia from a 
different perspective, namely that of capabilities. We will base this discussion on the ideas of 
the philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2011), amongst others and reflect on the concept of 
agency in relation to people with dementia in the framework of the CRPD.  
But first, what do we mean by agency and capabilities? In its broad sense, ‘agency’ means 
‘intention or consciousness of action [enacted by the agent], sometimes with the implication of 
possible choices between different actions’ (Barnard and Spencer 2002, p.891). Boyle (2014), 
on the other hand, defines agency as the ability to intiate social action or at least influence 
one’s own personal circumstances.   
The concept of ‘capability’ stems from the theories of the economist Amartya Sen (in the early 
1990s), which were later developed by the philosopher Martha Nussbaum (mentioned above). 
According to Harnacke (2013, p.769),  “the capabilities approach views society as having to 
provide certain capabilities for everyone, which are substantive or real opportunities, at an 
appropriate threshold level for each.” More concretely, Harnacke explains that frameworks 
such as the CRPD and the capabilities approach both aim for societal measures to empower 
individuals regarding their own abilities.  
Very often it is assumed people with dementia have no agency. In this section, we explore 
how the concepts of agency and capabilities can be meaningfully applied to the specific 
experience of dementia. Indeed, as Eva Feder Kittay argued, “ensuring equal opportunity to 
people is admirable when people are in a position to take advantage of the opportunities on 
offer, but some who are disabled are not in this position” (2011, pp.55-56). This may be 
applicable to some people with dementia (due to the progression of the disease which often 
renders choice and empowerment increasingly difficult), especially for people with more 
advanced dementia. Hence, we will briefly review the capabilities approach and its limits, and 
then move on to consider new ways to extend the possibility of agency to people with 
dementia.  
Nussbaum reminds us that these limits to inclusion are the fundamental challenges posed to 
philosophical theories of justice (2010). In her explanation, she provides three examples 
(case A, case B and case C) of adaptation of the legal framework to the needs of people with 
cognitive disabilities. These examples are structured around the participation of a person with 
cognitive disability in a jury for a trial (Nussbaum 2010, p.88).  
 Case A describes how the participation of the person with a cognitive disability – 
which could easily include a person with dementia – is achieved by providing external 
support (e.g. by summarising documents to make them easier for people with 
dementia to understand). Useful guidelines can be found on the website of the DEEP 
network (see references section).  
 Case B describes a person in a similar situation in which the impairment is more 
severe but the person can ‘communicate his or her preferences to a guardian, who 
can then exercise the function on his or her behalf’. Case B, as Nussbaum reminds 
us, is still ‘conceptually’ easy, even though it involves a series of challenges which 
must be overcome.  
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 Case C describes a situation in which communication between the guardian and the 
person with disability seems to be impossible. This is particularly interesting as it calls 
into question the very roots/basis of inclusion and highlights some apparent limits to 
more conventional forms of inclusion. The challenge is perhaps for us to find ways to 
ensure equal citizenship for all.  
In Nussbaum’s argument, case C calls for the intervention of a guardian who is ‘empowered 
to exercise the function on that person’s behalf and in her interests’, a measure often not 
taken (Nussbaum 2010, p.91).  This highlights the apparent challenges to more conventional 
forms of inclusion. As we will see, these categories and the solutions proposed to ensure 
more equal citizenship are relevant to the issue of promoting the rights of people with 
dementia. Futhermore, we will see below that novel methods of communicating with people 
with dementia can enable them to be better heard and move towards greater autonomy and 
agency if they wish to, hence to move towards case A or B. 
Indeed, recognising dementia as a potential disability, in keeping with the capabilities 
approach, makes it possible to access a framework which offers a structure to further enforce 
the rights of people with dementia, regardless of the level of impairment. In this respect, Toby 
Williamson (2015) describes the PANEL principles, in which the last letter of this acronym 
stands for legality of rights and the ‘recognition of rights as legally enforceable entitlements’ 
(Williamson 2015, p.12). Hence, raising awareness about the CRPD in relation to the rights of 
people with dementia enhances our ability to propose new and more appropriate possibilities 
for people with dementia to enact their rights as equal citizens. This includes their capabilities, 
as described by Nussbaum (2011). The next step is therefore to find ways to ensure that the 
voices of people with dementia are better heard.  
A wide range of methods and appropriate support should be considered to ensure that people 
with dementia can participate in and contribute towards society on an equal basis with others 
(addressed in more detail in Section 8). New approaches to inclusion could enlighten us 
about ways to achieve this. Boyle (2014) provides an interesting practical case and novel way 
of thinking about the agency of people with dementia. Based on research involving people 
with dementia and their carers/supporters, she criticises the over-emphasis on rationality and 
claims that we need a broader concept to understand the agency of people with dementia. 
Indeed, she argues that we need to take into account the way in which agency is exercised by 
people with dementia in a creative manner which was not previously considered, namely by 
looking at more ‘socio-emotional’ forms of agency. She sheds light on the way in which the 
wishes and desires of people with dementia are expressed through body language as well as 
through subtle emotional changes and changes in mood. As Boyle reminds us (citing Morris 
2005), this is particularly relevant in the context of various relations of ‘assisted autonomy’ 
which are sensitive to such changes. Such sensitivity could be a step towards fulfilling some 
of the capabilities listed by Nussbaum (2011) (e.g. in relation to sexuality and consent which 
reflects the third core capability, namely bodily integrity
21
).  
Clearly, there are many possible novel and alternative ways to explore agency and these 
could be further explored in future research. Indeed, some of these capabilities might present 
very complex challenges with regard to enhancing agency and autonomy. Case C, described 
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 “Nussbaum defines bodily integrity as: ‘Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure 
against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual 
satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction’ (2011, p.33). See 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability_approach for a complete list with the nine other central 
capabilities defined by Nussbaum. 
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above, appears to be one of them. Moreover, Boyle (2014) highlights the need to explore this 
idea of socio-emotional agency among people with severe dementia. In many ways, exploring 
the wishes of people with the most severe forms of dementia touches on ongoing debates 
around the concept of personhood.  Some of these debates have been explored earlier in this 
discussion paper and will be considered in the next section, particularly in relation to person-
centred care. 
In presenting both challenges but also new possibilities to reinforce the agency of people with 
dementia in a framework of rights such as the CRPD, Boyle’s approach is helpful. It offers a 
new way of understanding the wishes of people with dementia and supporting them to 
perform their agency in novel, alternative ways. More research and the promotion of more 
positive attitudes towards people with dementia, in a framework of human rights and equality, 
could further open the door to greater enablement of people with dementia. Arguably, 
recognising dementia as a potential disability could favour such discussions in situations, and 
for example in public debates, in which dementia often remains invisible. 
Key messages 
- The capabilities approach (based on the work of Sen and Nussbaum) is a framework of 
protected rights that allows people to be ‘empowered regardless of their own abilities’. 
- The CRPD could, according to Harnacke, be considered as reflecting the characteristics of 
such a framework. It allows for people with dementia to have their rights recognised as 
‘legally enforceable entitlements’ regardless of their actual capabilities. This represents a 
move towards equal citizenship. 
- It may be helpful to combine such a framework with an exploration of novel ways to take into 
account the agency of people with dementia (e.g. building on Boyle’s concept of ‘socio-
emotional agency’).  
- Paying attention to subtle emotional changes, as well as to changes in mood, and to body 
language, may improve our understanding of the wishes of people with dementia.   
- Exploring new ways to take into account the agency of people with dementia within a 
relevant framework of rights, such as the CRPD, may help ensure that people with dementia 
have the opportunity to take part in society and in decisions related to care and support. 
7 Care, support, disability and dementia  
Promoting the concept of care and support  
In addition to discussing access to rights and equal recognition before the law, it is important 
to consider the level and quality of care and support for people with dementia. According to 
an OECD report (2015, cited by Shakespeare et al. 2017) dementia is still one of the 
conditions that receives the lowest quality of formal care in the developed world. This is 
particularly significant when we consider that a lot of informal care and support (which more 
often than not is essential) is provided by families, friends and neighbours. It is also a major 
concern for many people living with dementia, especially for those with more advanced 
dementia. We might therefore ask whether recognising dementia as a potential disability 
would lead to any improvement in the care and support (both informal and professional) of 
people with dementia. This is a matter of concern, especially if we acknowledge that the 
social model of disability, which developed out of the disability movement, promotes 
autonomy as one of its most central values. The concept of care has been criticised recently, 
in relation to dementia, as being too narrow and potentially leading to the framing of people 
with dementia as having certain needs of a more medical nature and rending them passive. 
For this reason, wherever possible we refer to care and support in the broader sense. 
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However, in certain places in this text, the debate is fundamentally about the provision of care 
and this is therefore reflected in the terminology used.      
 
Questioning the focus on autonomy  
Within the social model of disability, care and dependency do not appear as priorities. In a 
previous section of this discussion paper, we have looked at the importance that is attached 
to independence, both in daily life and in legal frameworks such as the CRPD. We fully 
support efforts to promote more independence and rights for people with dementia for whom 
care is often an integral part of their lives. However, due to the nature of dementia, and the 
range of impairments that are associated with it, it is essential to reconsider what it means to 
be dependent upon relations of care, whilst still being able to exercise agency.  
Recognising dementia as a potential disability should therefore also involve an attempt to 
reinstate the importance of care and the validity of certain forms of  interdependency. For 
example, a person with dementia may be dependent upon his/her partner for care or support 
but the partner may be emotionally dependent on him or her. According to Boyle (2014), the 
concept of interdependency represents a departure from current definitions of agency which 
tend to be ‘over-individualistic’. She points out  that ‘throughout our lives, all of us go through 
varying degrees of dependence and interdependence’ (Boyle citing Tronto 1993, p.135). 
Interdependency therefore describes the way in which people are never fully independent and 
always rely in some ways on others. Taking this perspective allows us to question relations of 
‘dependence’ and not consider these as problematic per se. 
To explore this idea of care and interdependency, which may appear paradoxical
22
 at first 
sight (in the context of the social model of disability), we will draw on Eva Feder Kittay’s work 
on  the ‘ethics of care’. Kittay (2011) describes how taking relations of care and 
interdependence into account when developing theories of justice provides the means to 
achieve more autonomy for people with disabilities. The principle of justice reflects the moral 
obligation to act on the basis of fair adjudication
23
 between competing claims. It is linked to 
fairness, entitlement and equality. With reference to Aristotle, Gillon (1994) argues that it is 
important to treat equals equally and unequals unequally in proportion to inequalities which 
are morally relevant. In other words, in some situations (e.g. when a person has an 
impairment and experiences disability), it would be right to treat a person differently 
(unequally) as treating him/her in the same way as others would actually be unfair.  
Kittay draws attention to traditional schools of thought which take justice as a starting point for 
reflection on the position of the moral agent (in this case, the person with a disability). She 
explains that this results in a tendency to conceptualise this person as ‘an independent, 
autonomous self who is equal, or potentially so, to all moral agents’ (Kittay 2007, p.4) and 
calls for dependency to be reinstated as a central part of any human relation. For Kittay 
(2011), assistance is a resource, not a limitation. She suggests that the relation of care, 
should be perceived as supportive, rather than paternalistic, adding that:   
“paternalism is the only alternative to autonomy when autonomy is the norm of all 
human interaction” (Kittay 2011, p.55).  
Therefore, if certain aspects of the social model of disability were to be applied to people with 
dementia experiencing disability, this might challenge the current over-emphasis on the 
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importance of autonomy. It might also contribute towards a more nuanced understanding of 
disability. Such nuances are brought about through the re-evaluation of dependency and by 
recognising the validity of individual experiences of impairment.  
During discussions linked to the preparation of this paper, a member of the EWGPWD 
emphasised the importance of such an approach to care. Based on her own understanding of 
care in dementia, she emphasised the need to distance herself from paternalism. Her use of 
certain terms in relation to her own experience of dementia such as ‘requiring support’ and 
‘care partner’ are in keeping with this transformation of our understanding of care. A 
distinction was also made between being ‘cared for’ and ‘caring about’. ‘Caring for’ sees the 
person with dementia as a passive recipient of care. ‘Caring about’ reflects a relationship that 
is dynamic and involves give and take, in which the person with dementia and the care 
partner interact in a relationship with each playing a ‘caring’ role. These roles such as 
husband, wife, partner or friend would have existed prior to the diagnosis of dementia. In this 
way, she emphasises equality in moral status and enablement as part of the construction of 
meaningful relations of care. This is echoed by Boyle (2014), in the context of ‘assisted 
autonomy’, who highlights the importance of promoting supportive relations of care.  
Care as a new opportunity to improve the recognition of disability within society  
Recognising the importance of the relation of care and support, and of the experience of 
impairment, provides an opportunity to improve the inclusion of people with dementia in all 
aspects of life. Indeed, Kittay (2011) explains that ‘the scope of care extends beyond intimate 
relations’ and ‘can introduce new values into the public domain’. An ethics of care should 
therefore be a central part of any message to the public if dementia is to be recognised as a 
potential disability. The importance of a revaluation of the relation of care was also expressed 
by some people with dementia:  
“Care should be enabling, something that enhances my autonomy and allows me to 
participate in civil society, whilst promoting my dignity. For this to be possible, future 
therapists and healthcare professionals must be properly trained, and a more holistic, 
person-centred approach to both formal and informal care should be promoted.  
For me personally, this would focus on meaningful activities (e.g. based on the arts 
and relaxation) and a reduction of psychoactive medication to regulate mood and 
anxiety. Such person-centred care can bring about improvement and better account 
for the wishes of people with dementia” (both extracts from a member of the 
EWGPWD). 
In contrast to the establishment of meaningful and enabling relations of care, Kittay highlights 
a certain set of behaviours that she considers unhelpful:  
“dependence may in various ways be socially constructed, and unjust and oppressive 
institutions and practices create many sorts of dependence that are unnecessary and 
stultifying
24
” (Kittay 2011).  
Instead, she argues in favour of ‘cooperative, respectful, attentive relations’ (2011, p.55). We 
can therefore conclude from these two statements, and from the statements in the previous 
section, that it is not sufficient to argue for care as a means to support independence, or to 
give too much importance to autonomy, as is sometimes the case in the social model of 
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relations of dependence can be psychologically distressing.  
 Page 37 of 61 
 
disability. Rather, it is essential to question the relation of care itself, and differentiate those 
relations of care that are disabling from those that are enabling.  
 
 
Person-centred care and enablement  
Person-centred care, which emerged from the work of Tom Kitwood, has been described as 
involving the tailoring of a person’s care to his/her interests, abilities, history and personality 
(Alzheimer’s Society, 2017). Indeed, person-centred care appears to be a valuable means to 
enable, or sustain as much as possible, the active involvement of people with dementia in 
decisions related to care. In this framework, relations of care are established in such a way as 
to overcome the impact of a ‘malignant social psychology’, which is associated with a process 
of ‘othering’ of the person with dementia following the progression of neurological impairment 
(Kitwood 1992). According to Kitwood (1992), this process of ‘othering’ creates and reinforces 
a distinction between us and them, jeopardising the experience of empathy between the 
person with dementia and his/her carer, but also between the person with dementia and the 
rest of the world (see also section 5.2 on stigma). Indeed, in the context of a ‘new culture of 
dementia care’, Kitwood  (1997) explicitly recommended considering dementia primarily as a 
disability. He suggested that how a person is affected by dementia depends crucially on the 
quality of care. Care and support should therefore be central to any discussion about the 
recognition of dementia as a potential disability.    
Indeed, person-centred care could be seen as a step towards sustaining a broader ‘ethics of 
care’
25
 (an idea that we mentioned earlier in this section). As such, it could apply to many 
different types of care and support, regardless of who or with what means it is provided 
(Morris, 2001). Reducing the impact of otherness by reinforcing empathy towards people with 
dementia may therefore be a means to both promote the dignity of people with dementia and 
respect their human rights. Morris further  argues
26
 that an ethics of care should allow people 
to state their opinion and participate in decisions which affect their lives.   
The ‘ethics of care’ debate has implications for formal/paid care for people with dementia. It 
also has direct implications for how paid carers are educated and trained. The recognition and 
promotion of agency as a concept and how that rolls out in practice in the formal care sector 
need exploration. This will undoubtedly give rise to ethical questions about the extent to which 
formal services set parameters on the enablement of people with dementia. 
We also need to bear in mind criticisms that have been made about such concepts in relation 
to disability, which may be particularly relevant with regard to dementia. To broaden the 
discussion, we should examine in more depth a point made by Morris about participation in 
the provision of care (2001, p.15):  
“Whatever “care” is - whether it is in the form of formal services, cash payments, or 
personal relationships - if it does not enable people “to state an opinion,” “to 
participate in decisions which affect their lives,” and “to share fully in the social life of 
their community,” then it will be unethical.” 
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 Whilst we propose broadening the concept of care to include, or even focus on, support, the term 
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 Drawing on statements from the first edition of “In from the cold”  (1981) – “a liberation magazine for 
people with disabilities”. 
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Morris’s statement, which rightfully highlights the importance of enabling choice, begs a series 
of questions about the limits of enablement, such as:  
 What if such an emphasis were to lead to misunderstandings about the difference 
between ethical and unethical care?   
 What about care which is simply performed to the best of a carer’s ability, with due 
consideration for dignity and agency, but unsuccessfully (in terms of recognising and 
promoting agency)?   
 Would the non-fulfilment of such objectives be perceived as unethical?  
 What if the socio-economic context makes it difficult for both the carer/supporter and 
the person with dementia to establish an effective relation of care and support?  
 Should these be considered unethical relations of care and support? 
Some of these reflections about the social context have been considered by Gilleard and 
Higgs (2010) in relation to negative perceptions of impairments in later life and the impact this 
may have on care and support. We still have a lot of issues to explore but it is nevertheless 
clear that dependency and care/support should not be perceived as interfering with the 
recognition of dementia as a potential disability. 
Key messages 
- New ‘socio-emotional’ approaches to agency and the exploration of these new approaches 
could be a better means to account for the wishes of people with dementia with regard to their 
own care, support and lives in general.  
- It is nevertheless important to acknowledge that in the case of more advanced dementia it 
may be more difficult (but not impossible) to ‘listen to the voice’ of the person with dementia.  
- Recognising dementia as a disability is not only a matter of claiming rights, autonomy and 
independence. It should also address care and support needs, and give more focus to a 
positive conceptualisation of interdependency.  
- Promoting care may appear to challenge the idea that disabilities are the sole result of 
‘oppressive institutions and policies, prejudiced attitudes, discrimination, cultural 
misrepresentation, and other social injustices’.  
- Improving the lives of people with dementia, as well as the recognition of their needs and 
associated disabilities, comes with the establishment of an ‘ethics of care’ to use Kittay’s 
term, and a nuanced understanding of care, dependency and interdependency, as well as the 
importance of support.  
8 Working towards an inclusive society  
In this section, we discuss the impact which re-framing dementia as a disability might have on 
social inclusion for those with a diagnosis.  We consider the kinds of measures and shifts that 
are needed for all people with dementia to be fully included in society.  In doing so, as 
mentioned earlier, we necessarily move away from individual ‘personhood’ as a concept, to 
consider dementia also in the wider contexts of human rights and intersectionality (i.e. 
different social identities such as gender and race which overlap and are generally associated 
with discrimination).  
Two broad questions arise here.  The first relates to the potential advantages for people with 
dementia of moving away from the still-prevalent medical model of dementia as a disease, 
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towards a social model of dementia as a disability
27
.  The second relates to the problems 
which may then arise for those who do not wish to accept the label of disability in order to 
achieve social inclusion.  Such opponents may well argue that they do not want to be socially 
included as people with disabilities, but simply as people on the same terms as anyone else.  
People with dementia clearly have the same right as anyone else to be fully included in 
society. It might, however, be argued that re-framing dementia as a disability is not 
necessarily the best way of achieving this for everyone.  
This section covers the ethics of social inclusion, the part played by the medical model of 
dementia in perpetuating social exclusion, the importance of intersectionality in thinking about 
social inclusion for people with dementia, and the appropriateness or otherwise of the 
‘dementia-friendly communities’ concept.  It considers how re-framing dementia as a disability 
might enhance social inclusion for people with dementia. Finally, it looks at the potential shift 
that is taking place in the dementia field from thinking in terms of the dependency needs of 
people with dementia, to their unassailable human rights. 
The ethics of social inclusion  
We start from the assumption that people with dementia have a fundamental right to be 
included in all aspects of society in which they wish to participate. This right should not 
diminish as dementia progresses, although the wishes of the person concerned may, of 
course, change over time. Working with a social model of disability, we can see that many 
existing obstacles to full social inclusion and citizenship for people with dementia are not 
directly caused by dementia itself.  Instead they are the result of external factors and social 
attitudes. If these factors and attitudes were to change, then both the nature of dementia and 
the experience of having dementia would also change. Indeed, Kitwood (1997) suggested 
that if social responses to people with dementia were appropriate and supportive from the 
start, then much of the ‘disease progression’ currently taken to be inevitable might be 
avoided. This is a profoundly ethical issue. From the perspective of ethical principalism 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2001), non-maleficence (avoiding causing harm) towards people 
with dementia and ensuring beneficence (doing good whilst trying to balance possible 
benefits against risks and costs), equality and justice, requires the full social inclusion of 
people with dementia.  We will argue below that we can only ultimately achieve this if we 
move from thinking about the needs of people with dementia, which can be met by others, to 
a concept of inalienable human rights (i.e. which cannot be taken or given away).   
Why are people with dementia socially excluded? The contribution of the medical model 
As outlined in section 4.2, the medical model of dementia places the ‘problem’ of dementia 
within the individual mind and body of the person with the diagnosis. This suggests that 
additional contributing factors such as the reactions of others are of little importance. The 
impact of social, psychological and environmental factors on the experience of people with 
dementia has been recognised in numerous forms over the past two decades. Examples 
include Lawton’s concept of ‘excess disability’, Kitwood’s (1997) work on the involutionary 
(meaning ‘inward turning’) spiral of dementia and Post’s work on hypercognitivity (which was 
mentioned earlier).  
Bartlett & O'Connor (2010), for example, highlight the ways in which the experience of 
dementia affects social status. Birt et al. (2017, p.200) refer to 'discourses of deficit' which 
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stigmatise people with dementia and negatively impact on the recognition of them as citizens 
with rights. A growing body of work has demonstrated, for instance, that, post-diagnosis, 
walking may be negatively reframed as undesirable ‘wandering’, which is then constructed as 
a ‘symptom’ of dementia (Brittain et al. 2017). Kate Swaffer, the founder of Dementia Alliance 
International, and herself a person living with dementia, has argued persuasively that the 
language used to describe people with dementia is a large part of the way in which stigma is 
perpetuated (Swaffer 2014).  Much of the terminology noted by Swaffer, which is detrimental 
to the interests of people with dementia (e.g. demented, victim and sufferer), has been 
inherited from the medical model of dementia. 
A diagnosis of dementia, in the context of the medical model, therefore attaches a 
stigmatising ‘disease label’ to the individual. This sets him or her apart from the rest of 
society.  McGettrick and Williamson note that for other groups of people with disabilities, 
 “The medical model was used…to explain disabled people’s exclusion from 
mainstream social and economic life, their oppression (especially through the use of 
institutional care) and their lack of recognition as having basic human rights” (Mental 
Health Foundation 2015, p.14).  
George (2010) notes that,  
“The everyday language we use to describe dementia shapes our perceptions of 
brain ageing and even contributes to what has been called the “social death” of those 
most severely affected.”  
The extent to which a person diagnosed with dementia to some extent ‘becomes’ his or her 
diagnosis is problematic, particularly when we consider the many differences between people 
with dementia and each person’s experience. 
Intersectionality and social inclusion 
One of the most striking aspects of the medical model of dementia is its assumption that 
people diagnosed with dementia cease to belong to any other reference groups or interest 
groups. As mentioned earlier, Takala (2009) points to the dangers of such a one-dimensional 
view. Such a view fails to consider that people with dementia continue to belong to a wide 
range of other social groupings (e.g. based on gender, social class, sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, religion, political belief, former occupation, roles within families, hobbies and 
interests, and many more including having other disabilities in addition to dementia). 
The term ‘intersectionality’ is used to refer to this difference among people with dementia. It 
was originally used by feminist theorists to reflect how in everyday life one is not only a 
woman, but also, perhaps, black, living in poverty and having a chronic illness. Indeed, there 
can often be as much that divides women as unites them, unless these additional facets of 
experience are also taken into account (Yuval-Davis 2006). People with dementia continue to 
be treated as if they were all the same (on the grounds that they share a common diagnosis).  
Commonalities between people with dementia and others (including other groups of people 
with disabilities) are less frequently noted. Paying attention to potential commonalities might 
lead to a more active/political/advocacy-based approach on the basis of rights and 
discrimination etc.  
Dementia-friendly communities or universal design? 
The recent move toward the creation of ‘dementia-friendly communities’ (or DFCs) may be 
seen as a positive one. It involves environmental and social change, rather than expecting the 
person with dementia to change and adapt. However, what is friendly to a person with 
dementia is, in most cases, friendly to all.  Equally, things that everyone finds difficult about 
contemporary life (such as noisy, crowded, uncomfortable places, the fast pace of 
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technological change, and confusion created by poor design lighting and signage in public 
spaces) are also likely to be upsetting and anxiety-provoking for someone with dementia. For 
these and other reasons, some people with dementia find the term ‘dementia-friendly’ 
somewhat patronising. This has led to debates about what is really needed – dementia-
friendly communities, or a more universal ‘design for living’ that is adapted to everyone’s 
needs and wishes.  As Swaffer (2014, p.713) comments, 
“I have been uncertain that ‘dementia-friendly communities’ is the right phrase as I am 
worried it encourages division rather than includes people.” 
A member of the EWGPWD also talked about her desire to ‘get rid of’ the term dementia-
friendly communities (DFCs) and instead talk about an inclusive society. She feels that DFCs 
are exclusionary and that dementia-friendly should not be part of our language. A DFC might 
be considered one which compensates for the problems people with dementia do have, but 
without adding new ones. However, steps such as taking more time, offering alternatives, 
giving a helping hand, where it is needed and appreciated, should be markers of any humane 
community, not one unique to the needs of people with dementia. 
People with dementia should not therefore be singled out as in need of special measures.  A 
society in which people offer to help anyone experiencing difficulties is one to aspire to. There 
is nothing unique to the experience of dementia which could not be experienced, in some way 
or to some extent, by any member of the community (e.g. getting lost, experiencing sensory 
overload, forgetting a name or address needed in order to complete an errand or appointment 
and not being able to find the right bus or train etc.).  Reflecting on our own experiences of 
this nature may therefore be one of the best ways to develop empathy with people who have 
dementia. This should also foster social inclusion within mainstream communities. This is 
better than putting people with dementia in separate hermetically-sealed safe spaces.  
At the same time, we need to find out what people with dementia experience as barriers to 
social inclusion and not simply assume that everyone finds the same things difficult. Age-
friendly initiatives, for example, do not necessarily respond to the needs of many people with 
dementia (who are increasingly being diagnosed at a younger age but also have certain 
needs which are not as relevant to older people in general). This is another reason why it is 
important to involve people with dementia in decisions about issues potentially affecting their 
incusion in society.  
Initial work to develop dementia-friendly communities (DFCs) has had the benefit of drawing 
attention to a very real problem, namely the extent to which many existing environments 
disadvantage and are inhospitable to people with dementia.  In this, the DFC initiative is to be 
welcomed as an early indication that the social model of disability is beginning to have an 
impact on thinking about dementia. It might, nevertheless, be argued that dementia-friendly or 
dementia-accessible communities imply that people with dementia are fundamentally different 
and have problems that are not shared by other members of the community. We still need to 
hear much more from people with dementia themselves - including those whose voices are 
not currently being heard – about their responses to initiatives such as DFCs. The DFC 
concept and various DFC initiatives vary considerably across Europe. Some DFCs have a 
fairly limited scope whereas others empahsise rights, citizenship and the active involvement 
of people with dementia (Alzheimer Europe 2015, Williamson 2016).  
Levels of participation and inclusion 
Clearly there are different degrees to which any one person with dementia might be socially 
included. Arnstein’s ladder (Arnstein 1971) is often used to represent different levels of citizen 
participation, ranging from manipulation at the lowest level to full citizen control at the highest 
rung. DFC principles suggest that the views of people with dementia should inform the 
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development of DFCs. If people with dementia are not actively involved in the design and 
delivery of particular interventions, these may be considered more tokenistic. 
In the box below, we highlight six ways to include people with dementia in society in a 
meaningful way. These have been taken from an adaptation of Arnstein’s ladder by Capstick 
et al. (2016)
28
 to apply to the social inclusion of people with dementia. 
Citizen Power: forms of participation which involve having a genuine influence on public 
awareness or consciousness raising.  The person with dementia has autonomous influence 
on others in society, and decides on the nature of the influencing activity (e.g. taking part in 
an action group or campaign) and its desired outcomes. 
Delegated Power:  participants are helped to take part in an influencing activity or form of 
action involving contact with the wider community (e.g. writing a report; producing guidance). 
Partnership: the person with dementia is actively engaged with members of the broader 
community on mutually-identified projects which have a shared goal, or co-produced 
outcomes (e.g. giving feedback on a service or intervention). 
Placation: the person is involved in personally meaningful activity, but in a relatively passive 
role (e.g. being taken to events as a spectator or audience member).  
Consultation: activity initiated by others that involves exchange of information, and/or 
meaningful social interaction  with persons with dementia, who are nevertheless recognised 
as equals, able to express of choice, and/or share decision-making. 
Informing:  the person with dementia is given information intended to inform his or her choice 
about whether to take part in an activity or event or not. He or she may be told in advance 
about things that are going to happen, but not asked to make suggestions.  Information 
provided is not necessarily in user-friendly format. 
The above approaches to social inclusion build on a perception of different levels of 
participation in relation to the exercise of power which date back almost 50 years. 
Nevertheless, most (with the exception of therapy and manipulation which have not been  
included in the above box) are still relevant to the issue of social inclusion. In the original 
version, the means of involvement were presented as rungs of a ladder. This suggested a 
hierarchy. But it has been argued that ‘the process of increasing participation should not be 
simplified to a one-dimensional parallel of climbing a ladder’ (Maier 2001, p.716). Not 
everyone is interested in the same level of involvement. One person may feel involved and 
valued as a result of having been informed about something, whereas another might prefer to 
play a much more active role. Each form of involvement should therefore be equally valued.  
More recently, there has been an emphasis on patient and public involvement and a whole 
range of approaches to the involvement of people with dementia in research, policy making 
and service provision. This involves people with dementia working alongside researchers, 
policy makers and service providers on a more equal basis, albeit with appropriate support if 
needed (in keeping with the principle of reasonable adjustment)
29
. Such approaches are often 
described in terms of ‘co-production’, ‘co-creation’ and ‘citizen involvement’ to name but a 
few.  
                                                     
 
28
 Adapted from Capstick et al. (2016). 
29
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From needs to rights: biopolitical life and dementia 
Following the work of Kitwood and others, it may be argued that much of the apparent 
progression of dementia is already the result of society’s responses and reactions. In this 
respect, anything that we can do to keep people with dementia socially included is, in itself, 
likely to reduce the deterioration that can result all too easily from loneliness, boredom, lack of 
interpersonal communication and absence of meaningful activity. It is not enough to move 
beyond merely ‘doing no harm’ in a context in which people with dementia are harmed daily 
by society’s response to them. We need to go further, moving towards ethical principles of 
equality and justice as well as beneficence.   
The work of Agamben (1999) draws attention to the way in which civil society divides its 
citizens into those who have biopolitical life (i.e. the status of political beings) and those who 
are relegated to a lesser status of ‘bare life’ only (also described as a ‘state of exception’).  
Currently, many people with dementia are relegated to this state of exception, and it becomes 
increasingly likely as their circumstances change over time.  The agenda may therefore need 
to shift to reinstating full human rights to people with dementia rather than attempting to meet 
their needs through initiatives that give them in a passive role.  Katz (2002) coined the term 
‘experts by experience’ to capture the sense that older people, including those with dementia, 
are in the best position to inform others about what it is like to have the condition, what is 
needed in order to make improvements, and how to shape the kind of society they wish to live 
in.   
Applying human rights principles to dementia promotes autonomy and decision making, which 
includes recognition of the right to take certain risks. Some members of the community, 
including many family members, do not consider it acceptable for people with dementia to 
take risks which may result in injury, or to make choices that others may see as resulting in  a 
threat to their personal dignity. It may be argued, however, that preventing people from doing 
things which involve or result in some degree of risk is an abuse of human rights. 
As Clough (2014) notes, a narrowly medical model of dementia, which is disease/condition 
specific, is no longer supported by evidence.  Instead we need a bio-psycho-social model of 
cognitive disability that is inclusive, and one that actively seeks social justice for and 
alongside people with dementia. We also need to  recognise the personal experience of 
impairment, and the diversity of the experience, needs and interests of people with dementia. 
Shakespeare et al. (2017) advocate a human rights approach to dementia and disability, 
suggesting that this would open up space for collaboration between people with dementia and 
other disability rights activists. 
Key message  
- There has been a shift of attention away from the medical model of dementia as a condition, 
requiring predominantly medical research and pharmacological remedies.  
- The adoption of a social model or framework for thinking about dementia is being 
increasingly encouraged.  A social model of disability, applied to dementia, reinforces the idea 
that we are all responsible for each other’s well-being or ill-being and that there is a great deal 
to be done to improve the lived experience of people with dementia. 
- A social model framework for thinking about dementia and a human rights approach 
challenges concepts and practice concerning the development of ‘dementia-friendly 
communities’. 
- Dementia is a human rights issue with equality and justice to the fore, and which locates 
those living with dementia within a socio-political context that is largely missing from current 
discourse.  
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 - If everyone has the same human rights, then these rights are not compromised when 
someone has dementia.  
- People with dementia may find it helpful and empowering to identify as a person with 
disability. However, a person with dementia should not have to accept the label of either 
disease or disability in order to have their human rights upheld. 
9 Conclusions 
The disability movement began over half a century ago but it is only in recent years that a 
dialogue has started about dementia as a disability. The main impetus for this emerging 
dialogue came from people with dementia themselves who have started to articulate their 
right to be treated as full and equal citizens. People with dementia must play a key role in 
identifying the issues at stake, contributing towards discussions and developing possible 
recommendations for governements, policy makers, Alzheimer associations, disability 
organisations and regulatory bodies. For this reason, we are pleased to have been able to 
include people with dementia in this work in two ways:  
 firstly, in the ethics working group responsible for the drafting of this paper, together 
with experts in disability, ethics, policy making, mental health and advocacy, and  
 secondly, in the context of an email survey and a one-day focus group discussion in 
which the members of the European Working Group of People with Dementia and 
their carers/supporters shared their experience and views with regard to the topics 
addressed.  
Throughout this discussion paper, we have highlighted the potential impact of recognising that 
dementia can lead to disability. At the same time, we have acknowledged that such disability 
may be experienced in different ways by different people with dementia and that some people 
with dementia will prefer not to take on an identity based on disability. We suggest that, 
overall, the ethical, practice and policy benefits of viewing dementia as a disability, such as 
the opportunity to campaign for rights, advocate for change and be covered by legislation 
promoting human rights (e.g. based on the CRPD), outweigh the disadvantages. We have 
therefore drawn attention to the challenges that dementia (and human agency) poses to 
existing models of disability and emphasised the need to retain and promote a positive 
attitude and more nuanced understandings of care, support, dependency and 
interdependency within society. In addition, we have emphasised the need to challenge 
theories of personhood and approaches to social inclusion which serve to exclude and 
devalue people with dementia, with or without disability. 
In terms of different ethical frameworks, the biomedical ethical principles highlighted by 
Beauchamp & Childess, Nussbaum’s capabilities and Kittay’s approach to the ethics of care 
provide solid grounds to argue in favour of the benefits of recognising dementia as a potential 
disability. Furthermore, specific ethical and related concepts (such as respect for autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence, justice, equality, agency and relationships of support and care 
etc.) dovetail with a rights-based approach, which is clearly framed in terms of disability rather 
than a disease-specific model. This, as the paper makes clear, further reinforces the benefits 
of viewing dementia as a disability. Though dementia has come late to the 'disability table', it 
provides a set of filters for human agency, disability and rights to come together and actually 
enable theory and practice about disability to be taken forward in positive and helpful ways for 
the whole of the disability movement.  
Furthermore, examining dementia as a disability brings a new complexion to the more 
traditional views of dementia. This paper calls for a progressive and positive change in 
society’s response to dementia, based on recognition of potential disability, accompanied by a 
change in attitudes and the provision of coordinated, appropriately funded and properly 
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monitored polices, services and support, thus leading to a positive change in the lived 
experience of dementia. None of these potential benefits should require a particular person 
with dementia to identify with disability. We need to be careful to recognise and respect 
difference and individual choice. It is hoped that this discussion paper will contribute in some 
way towards improving the lives of people with dementia who experience disability. We hope 
that it will also provoke thought on how to create a more inclusive society in which people with 
disabilities and dementia are not considered as ‘other’ or ‘them’, but simply as ‘us’ with the 
same rights and opportunities as everyone else to enjoy life. 
We have provided a lot of information in this discussion paper, raised and defended certain 
arguments, drawn conclusions and even made recommendations. However, the whole area 
of disability and dementia is ‘under construction’. It is early days and a lot still needs to be 
achieved in terms of understanding and action. We look forward to the continuing debate and 
to future developments in relation to ethics, policy and practice, which will hopefully have a 
positive impact on the lives of people with dementia.  




The general public 
 
 Bear in mind that impairments related to dementia may, in combination with other 
external factors, result in disability.  
 Strive to ensure that people with dementia have access, if and when needed, to the 
same rights and support as people with other disabilities.  
 Be sensitive to and respect people’s preferences regarding the use of the label 
‘disability’. 
 Aim to offer support and consideration in response to a specified, apparent or 
suspected need. 
 Avoid making it necessary for people to state that they have dementia or disability in 
order to access any support they may need. 
 Involve people with dementia in the development of initiatives to ensure their full 
citizenship and equal social inclusion in the local and wider community.  
 Look for ways to promote the full citizenship and social inclusion of everyone rather 
singling out people with dementia as a separate group (i.e. most if not all barriers are 
also encountered to some extent by people without dementia).  
 
Governments and policy makers  
 
 Use the ongoing evaluation of progress with the implementation of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) as an opportunity to 
highlight whether national provisions apply equally to people with dementia. If this is 
not currently the case, take necessary measures to rectify this in order to ensure that 
dementia is considered in relation to all policies linked to the application of the CRPD. 
 
 Involve people with dementia in the CRPD vetting process (e.g. by asking them to 
provide testimonies and commentaries). 
 
 Audit, and revise where necessary, official information and guidance regarding 
people with disabilities aimed at government departments and agencies, employers, 
businesses, organisations, and members of the public. This includes appropriate 
references to dementia as a condition which can give rise to impairments that can 
constitute a disability, and how disability legalisation and rights would apply for people 
with dementia. 
 
 Ensure that people with dementia have equal access to provisions and services for 
people with disabilities (e.g. disabled parking badges, free travel on public transport, 
appropriate support in the work place etc.). 
 
 Audit, and revise where necessary, training provided to all public sector staff with 
responsibilities for applying and upholding disability legalisation and rights, to ensure 
they are aware of and understand their duties and responsibilities to people with 
dementia when the impairments it causes constitute a disability. 
 
 Audit, and adapt where necessary, public spaces and buildings to ensure they are 
accessible to people with dementia and other cognitive disabilities. 
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 Use the PANEL principles
30
 to inform policy and service development in a way that 
incorporates a rights-based approach and ensure that people with dementia are 
included in this. This is particularly important when countries are decveloping national 
dementia strategies.   
 
 Meaningfully involve people with dementia and carers/supporters in the policy and 
service developments, and audits described above, in accordance with PANEL 
principles. 
 
Alzheimer Associations  
 
 Support people with dementia and carers to be on the boards and decision making 
structures of Alzheimer Associations. 
 
 Support the active participation of people with dementia in relation to their own self-
advocacy in policy development/research and political engagement. 
 
 Enshrine the priniciple of elevating the voice of the person with dementia and placing 
the person with dementia at the centre in the organisation’s overall principles and 
ethos, whilst also recognising the vital role played by carers and supporters. 
 
 Audit and revise where necessary, services and information provided to ensure they 
meet disability legislation and rights as they apply to people with dementia.  
 
 Use the PANEL principles to inform organisational and service development in a way 
that incorporates a rights-based approach and ensure that people with dementia are 
included in this. 
 
 Actively pursue opportunities for taking test cases to court regarding possible 
disability discrimination against people with dementia. 
 
 Meaningfully involve people with dementia and carers in the service developments 
and audits described above in accordance with PANEL principles. 
 
Organisations of, or for persons with disabilities 
 
 Audit, and revise where necessary, services and information provided to ensure they 
comply with disability legalisation and rights as they apply to people with dementia to 
ensure they include appropriate references to dementia as a condition which can give 
rise to impairments that can constitute a disability, and how disability legalisation and 
rights would apply to people with dementia. 
 
 Meaningfully involve people with dementia and carers in the service developments 
and audits described above in accordance with PANEL principles. 
 
Regulatory bodies 
                                                     
 
30
 For details, see: http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/media/1409/shrc_hrba_leaflet.pdf (p.1) and 
pages 16-17 in this document. 
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 Review and amend guidance on health and social care law and ethics to incorporate 
a social model of disability, disability legalisation and rights, as it applies to people 
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11 Glossary/list of abbreviations 
Beneficence: doing good whilst trying to balance possible benefits against risks and costs. 
CRPD: abbreviation for the United Nation’s Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, which came into force in 2006. 
Dementia: a set of symptoms, including loss of memory, mood changes, and problems with 
communication and reasoning. There are many causes of dementia, the most common being 
Alzheimer’s disease and vascular dementia. Dementia is a progressive condition. This means 
that symptoms become more severe over time and that people with dementia typically need 
support and eventually care as their dementia advances. 
Disability: “results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and 
environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an equal 
basis with others” (Source: CRPD 2006, Preamble e). 
Discourse: how we think and communicate about people, things, the social organisation of 
society, and the relationships among and between all three. Discourse typically emerges out 
of social institutions like media and politics (amongst others), and by virtue of giving structure 
and order to language and thought, it structures and orders our lives, relationships with 
others, and society (Cole 2017). 
Equity and justice: treating people equally and fairly e.g. ensuring that they have the same 
opportunities and access to goods and services.  
Homogenised: rendered uniform or similar. 
Homogenous: of the same or a similar kind of nature; having a uniform structure or 
characteristics. 
Impairment: any loss or limitation, albeit physical (e.g. loss of limbs), physiological (e.g. 
kidney disease), cognitive (e.g. Alzheimer’s disease), sensory (e.g. loss of hearing or vision), 
psychological (e.g. behavioural problems), or mental (e.g. psychosis) in nature, that may 
contribute to disability.  
Interdependency: the way in which people are never fully independent and always rely in 
some ways on others. 
Intersectionality:  the interconnected nature of social categorisations such as race, class, 
and gender as they apply to a given individual or group, regarded as creating overlapping and 
interdependent systems of discrimination or disadvantage (Source: Oxford Living Dictionary). 
Justice/equity: the moral obligation to act on the basis of fair adjudication between 
competing claims. Involves treating people equally and fairly through a fair distribution of 
benefits, risk and costs. 
LGBT+: abbreviation of “lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and other minority sexual 
orientation and gender groups (apart from heterosexuual and cis gender groups
31
)”, typically 
used as a self-designation and typically covering anyone who does not consider themselves 
to be heterosexual or whose gender identity does not match the sex that they were assigned 
at birth.  
                                                     
 
31
 Cisgender – where an individual’s experience of their own gender corresponds with the sex they were 
assigned at birth. 
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Non-maleficence: not doing what might be harmful or hurt somebody. 
Paradigm: a philosophical and theoretical framework or school of thought with underlying 
theories, laws, assumptions and generalisations which influence the way we make sense of a 
particular issue e.g. in the field of dementia, disability, research or psychotherapy. If we think 
of the phrase “thinking inside the box”, the paradigm might be the box.  
Pathological: caused by or related to a disease.  
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national level. 
 
Jean Georges has been the Executive Director of Alzheimer Europe since 1996. Prior to this, 
he worked as a journalist and as a parliamentary assistant to members of the Luxembourg 
and European Parliament. He was responsible for setting up the European Dementia Ethics 
Network in 2008 and has since contributed towards several ethics projects in that context. 
 
Dianne Gove is Director for Projects at Alzheimer Europe and Chair of the Ethics Working 
Group on Dementia and Disability. Her background is in psychology, education (focus on 
gender and disability) and psychotherapy (analytical Gestalt therapy). In 2013, she was 
awarded a PhD for her research into general practitioners’ perceptions of dementia and 
stigma. She is also an Honorary Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Bradford.  
 
Sébastien Libert is a PhD student based at University College London, and part of the 
Interdisciplinary Network on Dementia Using Current Technologies (INDUCT). His research 
looks at the interaction between the use of technologies relating to dementia, and society’s 
representations of ageing, dementia, and cognitive decline. He developed his interest in 
health and society during his studies in Medical Anthropology and Sociology, mainly through 
his Masters degree at KUL, (Leuven, Belgium) and KU (Copenhagen, Denmark) and his 
Bachelor’s degree at ULB (Brussels, Belgium).  
 
Grainne McGettrick (BSc, MA) has spent her career working in field of disability and in 
dementia in the NGO sector.  She has lead out on several national and international research 
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and policy advocacy projects in the sector and has significant experience of working on rights-
based agendas and community development for marginalised and disadvantaged people. 
She worked for more than ten years as the Policy and Research Manager with The Alzheimer 
Society of Ireland.  In 2014, she moved to work with Acquired Brain Injury Ireland, where she 
is responsible for managing the policy and research functions.   
 
Helen Rochford-Brennan is from Tubbercurry in County Sligo. Helen spent many years 
working in the US and the UK before returning to Ireland to work in the tourism and disability 
sectors. Helen was diagnosed with Early Onset Alzheimer’s. She joined the European 
Working Group of People with Dementia in October 2014. She recently stepped down as 
Chair of the Irish Dementia Working Group and is currently Chair of the EWGPWD and a 
member of the Board of Alzheimer Europe. 
 
Helga Rohra is, from Germany. She was a language interpreter and was diagnosed with 
Lewy Body dementia in 2008. She has been a member of the European Working Group since 




Toby Williamson is an independent consultant working in the fields of adult and older people’s 
mental health, mental capacity and safeguarding, with a particular focus on dementia in the 
last 10 years. He has many years’ experience in frontline mental health services, research, 
evaluation, practice and service development, and policy work (both inside and outside 
government). He has particular expertise in rights, values, social inclusion, empowerment and 
working with seldom heard groups. He has co-authored a book on mental health and mental 
capacity legislation and is currently co-authoring a book on rights, values and dementia. 
 
Members of the European Working Group of People with Dementia and their 
carers/supporters 
 
Alzheimer Europe would also like to thank the members of the European working group and 
their carers/supporters who, in the context of a one-day face-to-face consultation and email 
survey,  provided feedback on a range of issues, and shared their thoughts and feelings 
about dementia as a disability with the ethics working group.  
 
European Working group of People with Dementia 
 
Helen Rochford-Brennan (Ireland) 
Helga Rohra (Germany) 
Amela Hajrič (Bosnia Herzegovina) 
Idalina Aguiar (Portugal) 
Alv Orheim (Norway) 
Chris Roberts (United Kingdom) 
Nina Balačkova (Czech Republic) 
Karin Gustafsson (Sweden) 
Markku Parkkisenniemi (Finland) 
Carol Hargreaves (United Kingdom) 
 
Carers/supporters of a member of the EWGPWD 
 
Samra Kučuk (Bosnia Herzegovina) 
Nelida Aguiar (Portugal) 
Berit Orheim (Norway) 
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Jayne Goodrick (United Kingdom) 
Kveta Provinska (Czech Republic) 
Lars Gustafsson (Sweden) 
Sisko Kärki (Finland) 
Jayne Middleton (United Kingdom) 
 
We would also like to thank our member associations for their help in verifying the accuracy of 
translated terms in Appendix 1 and Dr Anna Mäki-Petäjä-Leinonen from the University of 
Helsinki for clarification regarding a particular legal issue.   
 Page 60 of 61 
 
14 Appendix 1 – Translations of impairment and disability  
The table below contains translations of the terms impairment and disability in several 
languages. These terms have been taken, where possible, from examples provided on 
http://www.linguee.com, focusing on terms used in translations of the second paragraph of 
article 1 of the CRPD (often derived from documents on http://eur-lex.europa.eu). The text is 
as follows:  
“Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may 
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.” 
This text was chosen as it makes a distinction between the two terms but it should also be 
borne in mind that it reflects the social model of disability. In everyday life, many people use 
other terms and in some cases do not make a distinction between the two (e.g. in the Czech 
Republic and Bulgaria).  Translations are not included for a couple of countries due to failure 
to reach consensus on the translation of either term.  
We did not have access to qualified translators with expertise in the field of disability. The 
following table is only intended to help non-native English speakers have a better idea of the 
terminology being used in this report. We welcome any feedback (info@alzheimer-
europe.org).  
 
Language  Translation of impairment Translation of disability 
Bulgarian увреждане увреждане 
Czech zdravotní postižení   zdravotní postižení 
Danish funktionsnedsættelse handicap 
Dutch beperking handicap 
Finnish toiminnanrajoite vamma 
French  incapacité handicap 
German Beeinträchtung Behinderung 
Italy menomazione disabilità 
Luxembourgish Aschränkung Behënnerung  
Norwegian funksjonsnedsettelse handikap  
Polish naruszoną niepełnosprawnych 
Portuguese incapacidades deficiência 
Romania incapacități handicap 
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Slovakian porucha zdravotne postihnutie 
Spanish  deficiencia discapacidad 
Swedish funktionsnedsättningar funktionshinder  
 
 
